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Parties are entitled to have their theories of the case
presented to the jury in the form of instructions only if they
are supported by the evidence.
Powers v. Gene's Building
Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977).
2.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in allowing

an

unavoidable

accident defense theory to be presented to the jury?
Because an appeal challenging the refusal to give jury
instructions presents questions of law only, the appellate
courts grant no particular deference to the trial court's
rulings. A party is entitled to have his theories of the case
submitted to the jury provided there is competent evidence to
support them.
Failure to give requested instructions is
reversible error if it tends to mislead the jury to the
prejudice of the complaining party or erroneously advises on
the law. Carpet Barn, 786 P.2d at 775.
3.

Did the trial court err in failing to grant plaintiff's

Motion for Judgment NOV?
The Utah appellate courts review denial of motions for
directed verdict and, correlatively, motions for judgment NOV,
under the same standard as applied to the trial court: M A
motion for a directed verdict requires the trial court to
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
against whom it is directed.
The case should not be taken
from the jury where there is substantial dispute in the
evidence . . . .
On appeal, this Court applies the same
rules."
Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co. . 781 P.2d 445, 451
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
4.

Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiff's Motion To

Have Costs Taxed By The Court?
The trial court can exercise reasonable discretion in
regard to the allowance of costs, and has a duty to guard
against any excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof. Morcran
v
Morc an
« Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
* RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
The following rules and statutes are relevant to tne
issues presented on this appeal.

2

The full text of each of these

rules and statutes is contained in the Addendum, pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Utah R. Civ. P. 50
Utah R. Civ. P. 51
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)
Utah R. Civ. P. 59
Utah Code Annotated 1993:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-8 (1993)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
This case is a negligence action, sounding in tort, brought by
plaintiff, Anna Anderson, against defendant, Leonard D. Sharp, for
injuries

suffered

by

plaintiff

resulting

from

an

automobile

accident with defendant.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court.
The complaint in this action was filed on May 15, 1989.
1-2)

(R.

The case was tried, for the first time, on August 24, 25, and

26, 1992.

(R. 250-53)

Because of various errors, the court felt

is necessary to order a mistrial. (R. 250)
was retried on November
November

4,

1993,

the

Accordingly, the case

2, 3, and 4, 1993.
jury

returned

a

(R. 340-44)

verdict

in

favor

On
of

defendant, (R. 350-54), finding that defendant was not negligent.
(R. 354)

3

On or about November 9, 1994, defendant filed a Memorandum of
Costs and Disbursements with the court.

(R. 355-58)

or about November 18, 1993, filed two motions:

Plaintiff, on

One for Judgment

NOV or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial, (R. 359-60), and the
other to have costs taxed by the court. (R. 3 66)

On December 9,

1993, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiffs two
motions. (R. 481-82)
On or about January 10, 1994, plaintiff filed her Notice of
Appeal. (R. 486)

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Stay of Execution

Pending Appeal on or about February 24, 1994. (R. 491-96)

The

court granted this motion, upon the filing of a supersedeas bond in
the amount of $3,000, on July 9, 1994.

The case was poured over

from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals for
disposition on or about March 2, 1994. (R. 503)
Statement of the Facts.
The

accident

at

issue

occurred

on

March

10,

1988

at

approximately 10:00 a.m., in Utah county, on the northbound lanes
of the 1-15 freeway, just south of the point of the mountain.
73)

(T.

There had been a snowstorm the previous night, which had

cleared up prior to the accident, and from which the road crews had
been cleaning up that morning.

(T. 74)

The plaintiff, Anna Anderson, testified about the accident as
follows:
On the morning of March 10, 1988, at approximately 9:00 a.m.,
she left Provo and began to travel northbound on 1-15, intending to

4

go to Salt Lake City. (T. 70-71)

At the time she set out, the road

was clear and the conditions were sunny. (T. 72)

When she got to

Lehi, just north of a brick company located just off the freeway,
it began to get cloudy, (T. 72) , and became windy and wet, with
some blowing snow. (T. 73)
She came upon a snow plow, which was travelling northbound,
straddling the right and emergency lanes, and shovelling snow. (T.
74)

The snowplow was travelling at about thirty miles per hour.

(T. 75) Concerned about the snow plow, she signalled, changed from
the right lane, in which she had been travelling, into the center
lane, and passed the snow plow. (T. 76)

She felt that this would

be easier because snow was blowing and the center lane was clearer,
(T.

76, 110) , although

she did not feel that

there

was any

particular hazard in passing the snow plow. (T. 76)
The wind was blowing a great deal at that time, the roadway
was wet, and snow was blowing up ahead of her. (T. 76) l

She was

travelling at approximately 50 to 55 miles per hour, which she
considered to be a safe speed. (T. 77) 2 A car passed her in the

1

Mrs. Anderson stated in her testimony in the prior trial that "when the wind was blowing the
snow it was, like I said, a sheet. It was more like cheesecloth. You could see, but it was still - it
was blowing hard. And I saw cars ahead of me - 1 can't tell you exactly how, but I saw them braking
and I thought maybe I better slow down a little, too; there might be somebody in front of me that —
I don't know, because it was kind of blinding." (T. 116 quoting prior T. 320)
2

In her affidavit, Mrs. Anderson stated that she had been travelling at 45 miles per hour and, on
cross-examination, indicated that her estimate could have been off by as much as ten miles per hour,
but no more. (T. 104)
5

left lane, going quite fast. (T. 75) Mr. Sharp was nowhere around
at that time. (T. 118)
"Quite a ways" ahead of her, she saw a brake light and became
concerned, (T. 77), so took her foot off the gas pedal and slowed
down. (T. 75)

She was in fourth gear at that time, and "didn't

slow enough to make a difference to slow in changing gears." (T.
77-78) 3

She doesn't remember if she put on her brakes or not. (T.

77-78)
The accident occurred a "couple minutes" after she passed the
snowplow. (T. 77) Immediately before the collision, she looked in
her rear view mirror and saw Mr. Sharp "coming up quite fast." (T.
78)

She saw his face and knew she was going to get hit. (T. 78)

This was her very first awareness that Mr. Sharp was following her
in the center lane. (T. 118) She did not speed up because she was
going as fast as she could,
because

there

was no time

(T. 120) , and didn't change lanes
to think

about

it, (T. 12 0) , but

stiffened up and gritted her teeth to brace for the impact. (T. 78)
Mr. Sharp then crashed into her. (T. 79)

She was pushed

forward and her car fishtailed. (T. 79) This was a "very abrupt .
. . strong shove forward." (T. 79)

She applied her brakes, trying

to stop, which made her fishtail "a little bit more." (T. 114) She
was extremely frightened. (T. 79)

3

Mrs. Anderson, in her prior testimony, stated: "If you slow down very much you have to shift.
I didn't have to shift because I was still going at a high enough speed I looked up in my rear view
mirror, hoping nobody was going to come up behind me, and that's when I saw the man . . . " (T.
114)
6

After the impact, Mrs. Anderson pulled her vehicle to the
right side of the road. (T. 79) Mr. Sharp's car followed her. (T.
79) Mr. Sharp came to her door after she stopped, and asked her if
she was all right. (T. 79) The snow plow came by, honked his horn,
and went ahead. (T. 80)
The defendant, Leonard D. Sharp, testified about the accident
as follows:
On the morning of March 10, 1988, he travelled southbound,
from Midvale, Utah, to the brick yard north of Lehi off of 1-15 to
obtain some sample bricks.

(T. 165)

Although

it had stormed

through the night, the weather was clear. (T. 165) As he left the
brick yard and got on the freeway, going northbound, he saw the
snow plow and Mrs. Anderson's vehicle ahead of him. (T. 166)

He

observed that the snow plow and Mrs. Anderson were adjacent to each
other,

(T. 184) ,4 and that they were at least a football field

length ahead of him at that time. (T. 168) 5 He did not observe
Mrs. Anderson pass the snow plow, (T. 185) , and did not notice
whether she was going faster than the snow plow or at the same
speed. (T. 186-87)

The snow plow was off the shoulder of the road,

proceeding northbound, and was not pushing any snow.

(T. 166)

4

Mr. Sharp also testified that he could not judge Mrs. Anderson's position relative to the snow
plow. (T. 166)
5

Mr. Sharp's testimony on this point is contradictory: Later, on cross-examination, he stated that
when he first saw Mrs. Anderson, she could have been a half mile or a mile in front of him. (T. 18384) He later equivocated about his ability to estimate distances, even though he was a self-employed
stone mason who did his own estimating. (T. 193) In the prior trial, he testified that Mrs. Anderson
was only one-half to three-quarters of a football field away from him. (T. 198)
7

Although traffic was very light at the time,

(T. 198) , he saw

several vehicles ahead of Mrs. Anderson. (T. 165)

At that time, he

was travelling between fifty and fifty-five miles per hour, (T.
168), and was gaining on the snow plow, (T. 185), even though he
did not have an estimate as to how fast the snowplow was going. (T.
189)
As he got closer to Mrs. Anderson and the snowplow, a car
began to pass him in the left lane. (T. 166)

At that time, he was

"looking to go into that lane" after the car passed him "because
[he] was gaining on Mrs. Anderson." (T. 166-67)

At that time, the

snow plow, which was still ahead of him, hit some snow and totally
blocked his vision. (T. 167, 185)
car. (T. 167)

He couldn't see Mrs. Anderson's

This was the only time Mrs. Anderson's car left his

range of vision. (T. 185)

He didn't see any brake lights. (T. 169)

Mr. Sharp's testimony as to what he did next is contradictory:
First, he stated that he stopped "at the same speed as the car that
was passing him," (T. 167), and, later, stated that he "applied his
brakes lightly, just braking to keep out of the vision he didn't
have." (T. 167)

"Then all of a sudden, the car was here." (T. 167)

He realized "we were going to hit if she didn't push on her gas."
(T. 169)

He put more pressure on his brake and then "bumped" Mrs.

Anderson. (T. 167)

He estimated that he was going between five to

ten miles per hour at the point of collision. (T. 196)
He then followed Mrs. Anderson off the road.
didn't

pass

the

snow

plow, which

8

was

then

in

(T. 170)

front

He

of Mrs.

Anderson. (T. 170-71)

The snow plow stopped, and its driver told

Mr. Sharp to get back in his car. (T. 171)
Mr. Sharp acknowledged that it was within the range of his
experience that snow plows occasionally hit snow and plowed it, and
that snow flies from a plow when it hits a drift. (T. 191)
Mrs. Anderson sought reimbursement of damages from Mr. Sharp
by bringing this action.
Prior

to

instructions.

trial,

the

Plaintiff

parties

requested

requested

a

rear-end

certain

jury

presumption

instruction, which provided as follows:
In most cases where one car "rear-ends" another, it
accords with common sense and experience to believe that the
following car has disregarded the duty to keep a lookout ahead
and to keep the car under control, and is, therefore, at
fault.
But such a conclusion is not necessarily always
correct.
It may depend upon the particular circumstances.
Bullock v. Unqricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975).
(R. 237)

Defendant requested an unavoidable accident instruction,

which provided that:
The law recognizes unavoidable accidents.
An
unavoidable accident is one which occurs in such a manner
that it cannot justly be said to have been proximately
caused by negligence as those terms are herein defined.
In the event a party is damaged by an unavoidable
accident, he has no right to recover, since the law
requires that a person be injured by the fault or
negligence of another as a prerequisite to any right to
recover damages. JIFU 16.1, page 53
(R. 100)
After

Mr.

Sharp's

testimony,

defendant's

counsel,

Mr.

Peatross, moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the facts
were undisputed and it was an unavoidable accident, "contrary to

9

what's been discussed so far regarding the recent case of Randall
[sic] versus Allen." (T. 203)
Mr. Howard, plaintiff's counsel, responded that "you can't run
into the back of a vehicle without a logical explanation," that the
defendant had to make the explanation, and, otherwise, that the
inference was that of negligence. (T. 206)
The court provided counsel with the instructions it planned to
use. (T. 2 06)

Mr. Howard objected to many of the instructions.

The following dialogue ensued:
Mr. Howard:
The Court:

I have a directed verdict instruction.
I can tell you right now I won't give it.

Mr. Howard: I don't think you should say that, judge.
It seems to me it's [sic] absolutely mandatory. But if you
don't five [sic] it you certainly ought to reserve it rather
than deny it, because that jury instruction is an untoward
thing and you could escape the thing by granting the motion
post-verdict.
Mr. Peatross: My fellow caught in a snow storm didn't do
anything wrong.
The Court: Despite the ruling of the supreme court, I
don't think it eliminates the of [sic] acts of God which may
be involved.
Mr. Howard:

You mean a snow plow operator?

The Court:
They could find the snow and blizzard
conditions are an act of God and not caused by anyone.
I
won't say that is or isn't an unavoidable accident and I won't
instruct on that, but - Mr. Howard: The court ought not to allow the jury to
speculate on matters of that subject.
Mr. Peatross:
your client.
Mr. Howard:

We've got quite a bit on the subject from
On acts of God?
10

Mr. Peatross: On snow.
can talk about the weather.

We can't bring God in, but we

Mr. Howard: The weather is something that's obvious to
you and you can arrive in accordance with it. The fact it's
snowing doesn't eliminate the responsibility of a driver to
avoid hitting cars in front of him. That's why I'm entitled
to a directed verdict.
The Court:

I don't agree with that.

Mr. Howard:

Think about it, judge.

The Court:
I have.
I've heard all of your client's
testimony, every word of it.
Mr. Howard: My view is it's my responsibility to keep
you from falling into error.
The Court:

I really appreciate that, too.

215-16)
Counsel then excepted and objected to the jury instructions.
Peatross stated:
In our original instructions submitted, which were
submitted before the previous trial — it was before the
case of Randall [sic] versus Allen — we included an
unavoidable accident instruction. I think it was similar
to MUJI 3.3. And for the record, I excepted not giving
that, because I think the court was in error in Randall
[sic] versus Allen, and if they were to address that
matter again they would change their minds.
217)

Mr. Peatross again moved for a directed verdict.

(T.

)

Mr. Howard also moved again for a directed verdict.

(T. 217)

also objected to the instruction of the court, as follows:
I also object and except to the instruction of the
court upon the following grounds, that there are other
instructions which tend to confuse the jury.
The
instructions as given are poorly organized.
The
instructions given are redundant, many to each other.
And consequently, they tend to confuse the jury.
11

I also object on the basis that the instructions as a
whole are overly emphatic of the defendant's theory of the
case.
And I also object that intermingled among the
instructions is a general misstatement of the law pertaining
to this case. And with specificity I object to instruction
#6, because it's redundant to instructions 4 and 5. And that
would mean that 4 and 5 are redundant to 6, so all three are
redundant to each other.
I also object to instruction
redundant to 4 and 5 and 6.

#7

because

it

is

I object to instruction #8 because I don't believe the
instruction has any place in any lawsuit because it tends to
emphasize one party's position over another. The court has
adequately instructed the jury upon what they can find, and it
is not necessary for the court to instruct on sympathy.
I object to instruction #10 for it's [sic] total
misstatement of the law and favors the defendant's position of
the case into the issues to be resolved by the jury, the
question of unavoidable accident.
Second sentence of
paragraph 1 is a misstatement of the law which is — which
will confuse the jury and allow them to speculate on circumstances and events that are outside the purview of the jury.
I object to instruction #16, which is the sudden
emergency instruction, because there is no foundation or basis
in the facts of this case to give such an instruction. And it
is error to allow the jury to speculate on an erroneous theory
of the law.
I object to instruction #20 as modified because there
isn't any reason for the jury to consider lost earnings.
I object to instruction #26, the chance instruction on
the basis it's [sic] unnecessary in reagard to other
instructions given.
(T. 218-19)
Mr. Howard then gave his closing argument.

(T. 222)

Peatross followed with his closing argument. (T. 222-243)
text

of

his

Appendix.)

closing

argument

is

contained,

in

full,

in

Mr.
(The
the

In this argument, Mr. Peatross, in essence, used an

unavoidable accident theory.
12

Upon the conclusion of the closing arguments, Mr. Howard
reiterated his motion for a directed verdict against defendant,
stating
I am sincere in my belief the court should direct a verdict to
the plaintiff on the basis that the plaintiff has established
by prime [sic] facie evidence — I should say conclusively
established, conclusively established the negligence of the
defendant and that reasonable men would not differ on that
subject.
(T. 245)

Mr. Howard also moved for a directed verdict on the issue

of plaintiff's negligence, requesting that the court instruct the
jury, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was not negligent. (T.
245)

The court took the motion under advisement. (R. 24 5)
After the jury returned the verdict in favor of defendant, Mr.

Howard orally moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (T.
249)

On or about November 9, 1994, defendant filed with the

court a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements.
memorandum

included,

among

other

things,

(R. 3 55-58).

the

costs

of

This
seven

depositions, including those of Leonard Sharp, for $107.45; Anna
Anderson, for $107.45; Michael Sabey, for $147.00; Greg DuVal, for
$39.40; Leonard Sharp, for $39.40; Anna Anderson, for $233.70; and
David Beaufort, for $97.02; as well as the cost of the prior trial
transcript, for $925.00. (R. 356-67)
deposition

costs,

other

than

the

No explanation for these

following

statement

by

Peatross, was included:
JEFFREY C. PEATROSS, being duly sworn, says that he
is the attorney for the defendant in the above-entitled
action, and as such, is better informed relative to the
above costs and disbursements than the said defendant.
That the items contained in the Memorandum are correct to
13

Mr.

best of the affiant's knowledge and belief, and that the
said disbursements have been necessarily incurred in said
action.
(R. 356)
Plaintiff
Alternative,

submitted a Motion for Judgment NOV or, ,in the

for a New Trial

on

or about November

alleging that the trial court erred in:

18, 1993,

(1) presenting defendant's

theory of unavoidable accident as a possible and acceptable defense
to the jury; (2) conducting voir dire and in denying the plaintiff's requested voir dire examination; (3) refusing to instruct
the jury that there was a presumption in favor of defendant under
the circumstances of the case; and (4) failing to enter judgment
notwithstanding the verdict when defendant failed to rebut the
presumption.

(R. 359-60)

Plaintiff also submitted a Motion to

Have Costs Taxed by the Court on November 18, 1993, (R. 366),
arguing that defendant failed to carry his burden of proving the
depositions at issue were reasonably necessary.

(R. 369)

On December 2, 1993, the trial court submitted its memorandum
decision on the matter, ruling on plaintiff's motions for Judgment
NOV and to Tax Costs by the Court, denying both motions.
80)

(R. 479-

The court stated, in relevant part:
The Plaintiff first asks for Judgment NOV because the
Court gave a jury instruction on the "unavoidable accident."
A closer reading of the jury instructions reveals that this
instruction was scheduled to be given in the first trial that
ended in a mistrial. As discussed with counsel, the Court
recognized this instruction is now inappropriate and it was
never given to the jury in this case. Plaintiff's argument
[sic] without foundation.
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Plaintiff finally argues that as a matter of law the
Defendant should be presumed negligent in rear-end collisions.
This is not the law in Utah and the facts do not support such
a presumption in this case.
The Court finds the costs as submitted by the Defendant
to be reasonable and necessary and sets the amount at
$2100.17.
(R. 479-80)

An order denying plaintiff's motions was entered on

December 9, 1993.

(R. 481-82)
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE IN A REAR END AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT.
Plaintiff

requested

a

jury

instruction

relating

to

the

presumption of negligence of a defendant in a rear-end collision.
The trial court refused to give such an instruction, reasoning that
it was not the law in Utah.

One who rear-ends a vehicle under

normal circumstances is presumed to be negligent, in the absence of
the

leading

vehicle's

fault.

Although

the

Utah

courts

have

rejected a per se liability theory in rear-end collisions, the
presumption at issue does not create a per se liability because it
is

rebuttable.

recognized

The

in Utah.

doctrine

of

The rear-end

res

ipsa

loquitur

is

collision presumption

well
is an

application of res ipsa loquitur, so is compatible with existing
Utah law.

Plaintiff adduced evidence sufficient to make a prima

facie showing necessary to qualify to use a rear-end collision
instruction. Where evidence supports the giving of an instruction,
the party is entitled to have its theory of the case presented
through the instruction.

The trial court refused to give the
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instruction

to which plaintiff

was

entitled

and,

accordingly,

committed reversible error•
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRESENTING AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
THEORY TO THE JURY.
The

use

of

unavoidable

accident

instructions

under

any

circumstances was prohibited by the Utah Supreme Court in Randle v.
Allen, 223 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1993) . An unavoidable accident theory
was presented to the jury through the trial court's instructions
and

defendant's

repetitive

and

counsel's

closing

unbalanced

nature

argument.
of

an

Because

unavoidable

of

the

accident

instruction, and other instructions given by the trial court, the
jury was confused because of the improper emphasis placed upon
defendant's theory of the case.

Because the evidence indicates

that at least one of the parties may have been negligent, an
unavoidable accident instruction is even more confusing, creating
additional error.

Because there is a substantial probability that

the jurors were misled by the presentation of the unavoidable
accident theory, the trial court committed reversible error.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT JUDGMENT NOV OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL, TO PLAINTIFF.
Judgment NOV should be granted if, viewing the evidence most
favorably
supporting

to

the

non-movant,

the verdict.

there

is

no

Because plaintiff

competent
brought

evidence
sufficient

evidence to support the giving of a rear-end collision instruction,
and defendant failed to rebut this presumption, even considering
the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, there is no
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competent evidence supporting the verdict, and judgment NOV is
proper.
Alternatively, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial under Rule
59(a)(1) and
plaintiff's

(7) because the trial c o u r t s
rear-end

collision

theory,

failure to present
coupled

with

its

presentation of defendant's unavoidable accident theory to the jury
was, (1) an abuse of discretion, and (2) an error in the law.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO HAVE
COSTS TAXED BY THE COURT.
Rule 54(d) is generally interpreted very narrowly as to what

costs may be taxed against a losing party.

Because deposition

costs are not included in the wording of the Rule or the associated
statutes, allowing them to be taxed is an exception to the rule.
This exception is currently allowed if depositions are taken in
good faith and are essential for the development and presentation
of the case.
This exception to the Rule should be abandoned by this Court
because:
the Rule;

(1) the exception does violence to the express wording of
(2) the standards

for determining which

depositions

should be taxed are unworkable; (3) the exception is inconsistent
with

the

rule

that

other

necessary

costs

of

litigation

are

disallowed; (4) the exception is not conducive to judicial economy;
and (5) the exception results in fundamental unfairness.
Further, defendant has not carried his burden of proof in
showing that the depositions were reasonably necessary, and the
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transcript from the prior trial was not a reasonable expense,
failing to justify the trial court's award of costs.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE
PRESUMPTION OP NEGLIGENCE IN A REAR END AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT.
A.

The Trial Court Refused To Give Plaintiff's Requested
Rear-End Collision Instruction.

Plaintiff's counsel requested a jury instruction relating to
the

presumption

of

negligence

of

a

defendant

in

a

rear-end

collision, which provided as follows:
In most cases where one car "rear-ends" another, it accords
with common sense and experience to believe that the following
car has disregarded the duty to keep a lookout ahead and to
keep the car under control, and is, therefore, at fault. But
such a conclusion is not necessarily always correct. It may
depend upon the particular circumstances. Bullock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975).
After discussion of the issue throughout the trial, the trial
court,

nevertheless,

instruction.

In

refused

its

to

memorandum

give

plaintiff's

decision,

responding to the same issue raised

the

requested

trial

court,

in plaintiff's Motion for

Judgment NOV, set forth its reasoning applicable to the denial of
the instruction as follows:

"Plaintiff finally argues as a matter

of law the Defendant should be presumed
collisions.

negligent

in rear-end

This is not the law in Utah and the facts do not

support such a presumption in this case."

(R. 479-80)

Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury is a
matter of law.

Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1,

2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Accordingly, the Utah appellate courts
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review a trial court's instructions for correctness only, giving
them no particular deference.

Id.

Plaintiff believes that the

trial court's reasoning and denial of the instruction is erroneous
as

a

matter

of

law,

and

its

refusal

to

give

the

requested

instruction constitutes reversible error.
B.

A Driver Who Rear-Ends Another Vehicle Under Normal
Circumstances Is Generally Presumed To Be Negligent,

It is commonly held that one who rear-ends a vehicle under
normal circumstances is presumed to be negligent. Norris v. Gatts,
738 P.2d 344, 348 (Alaska 1987); Hahn v. Russ. 611 P.2d 66, 67
(Alaska 1980); Bettner v. Boring, 764 P.2d 829, 833 (Colo. 1988).
In the absence of any fault on the part of the plaintiff, this
presumption is sufficient to make a prima facie case of negligence.
Boring v. Bettner, 739 P.2d 884, 885 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).

The

Missouri court described the presumption as
the doctrine or rule of law which recognizes that if one
person has his vehicle in a portion of the highway where
he should have it or is entitled to have it in view of
the course in which he is proceeding, and some other
person traveling behind him in the same direction
overtakes him and permits his vehicle to run into the
rear of the one ahead, the proof of a collision under
such circumstances makes out a prima facie case of
specific negligence against such other person in charge
of the overtaking vehicle.
Bettner, 764 P. 2d at 833 (quoting Doggendorf v. St. Louis Public
Serv. Co., 333 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Mo. Ct. App. I960)) (emphasis in
original).

This presumption applies in cases like the present

case, where both vehicles involved in the accident were located on
the road or on the shoulder, were in relatively close proximity at
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the time of the collision, and were facing the same direction. Id.
The presumption, also known as the "following car" doctrine,
is applied as follows:
We start with the well established rule of law, in
this jurisdiction, that in the absence of an emergency or
unusual condition, the following driver is prima facie
negligent if he runs into the car ahead. . . . When it
can be said, as a matter of law, that no emergency or
unusual condition existed, and the following car collides
with the forward vehicle, the following car's negligence
is not based upon the necessity to find, as a fact, some
affirmative act of negligence on his part
Contrariwise, when the forward car's action is not
reasonably anticipated, such as a sudden stop at a place
where none is to be anticipated, then the trier of fact
must find an affirmative act of negligence by the
following driver before he can be called negligent even
though he collided with the forward vehicle.
Enslow v. Helmke, 611 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
Plaintiff's requested instruction is consistent with these
characteristics of the rear-end presumption.6
C.

The Presumption
Precedent.
1.

Is

Compatible

With

Existing

Utah

The Presumption Does Not Create A Per-Se Liability
Rule Because It is Rebuttable.

The Utah courts have not specifically addressed the issue of
a rear-end collision presumption, but have dealt with rear-end
collisions through negligence analysis, finding that "a motorist
6

The rear-end collision instruction used by the Colorado courts provided as follows:
"'Presumptions' are rules based upon experience or public policy and established in the
law to assist the jury in ascertaining the truth.
In this case the law presumes that the defendant drove her car negligently when she
caused it to collide with the rear of the Plaintiffs vehicle.
Unless and until the presumption is outweighed by evidence to the contrary which as
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you must consider the presumption with the
other evidence in arriving at your verdict." Bettner, 764 P.2d at 831-32.
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who collides with a stationary vehicle on the highway is not guilty
of negligence as a matter of law without respect to the totality of
the circumstances."

Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P. 2d

217, 221 (Utah 1983); see also Watters v. Ouerry, 626 P.2d 455
(Utah 1981); Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co,
611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980); Watters v. Ouerry, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah
1978) .

The Utah court felt that it was necessary, in rear-end

collision cases, for the jury to make the allocation of liability
on the basis of the relative culpability of both parties, and to do
that, it was necessary for the jury to "assess the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the second driver's actions in light of all
the circumstances, including whatever action it takes to avoid a
collision, his initial speed, the initial speed of the first car,
road conditions, traffic conditions, and the like."

Harris, 671

P.2d at 222.
As the trial court observed, the Utah courts have rejected a
per se liability approach to rear end collisions.
presumption

at

issue,

as

reflected

by

However, the

plaintiff's

instruction, is not a per se approach to liablity.

requested

Contrary to the

trial court's understanding, the presumption does not make a rearend collision defendant liable as a matter of law because the
presumption may be rebutted.

The presumption can be rebutted where

the preceding driver is negligent or there is otherwise no reason
to

anticipate

Accordingly,

the
this

driver's

conduct.

presumption

does
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Hahn,
not

611

resolve

P. 2d
the

at 67.

issue

of

liability in the summary manner proscribed by the court, but shifts
the burden of proof of negligence from the leading to the following
driver if the following driver cannot show some reasonable reason
why he rear-ended the leading driver.
2.

The Presumption Is An Application of the Doctrine
of Res Ipsa Loquitur, Which is recognized in Utah,

Although the Utah courts have not specifically addressed a
rebuttable

presumption

of

negligence

in the

case

of

rear-end

collisions, well established Utah law is compatible with such a
presumption.
The Utah courts accept res ipsa loquitur as an "evidentiary
doctrine used in a negligence action to establish the defendant's
duty of care and the breach of that duty.11 Virginia S. v. Salt Lake
Care Center, 741 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

The purpose

of the doctrine is "to permit one who suffers injury from something
under the control of another, which ordinarily would not cause
injury except for the other's negligence, to present his grievance
to a court or jury on the basis that an inference of negligence may
reasonably be drawn from such facts, and cast the burden upon the
other to make proof of what happened."

Anderton v. Montgomery, 607

P. 2d 828, 833 (Utah 1980) (quoting Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (I960)).
reach

the

issue

of

causation;

obligation to prove causation.

the

The presumption does not
plaintiff

still

has

the

Id.

In Utah, to rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
plaintiff must establish the following foundation:
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The rule . . . is applicable when: (1) The accident was
of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would
not have happened had the defendant used due care, (2)
the instrument or thing causing the injury was at the
time of the accident under the management and control of
the defendant, and (3) the accident happened irrespective
of any participation by the plaintiff.
Virginia S. , 741 P.2d at 971; accord Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion
Corp.. 681 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1984); Anderton, 607 P.2d at 833.
The rear end collision presumption fits these requirements,
making

it a subcategory

or application

of res

ipsa

loquitur.

First, it is well settled that rear end accidents normally do not
occur, under normal circumstances, in the absence of negligence on
the part of the following driver.
833.

See, e.g., Bettner, 764 P.2d at

Second, the vehicle causing a rear end collision is normally

under the management or control of the following driver.

Finally,

for the presumption to apply, the accident must have happened
without any fault or negligence on the part of the leading driver.
See, e.g. , Hahn, 611 P. 2d at 68.

The purpose of a res ipsa

loquitur instruction, like a rear-end collision instruction, is to
"cast the burden upon
instrumentality
happened."

[the person who controlled the agency or

causing

the

injury]

to

make

proof

of

what

Kusy, 561 P.2d at 1235 (quoting Anderton, 607 P.2d at

833) .
Other

jurisdictions

have

recognized

that

the

rear-end

presumption is an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
because a rear end accident does not normally occur in the absence
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of negligence.

Norris, 738 P.2d at 348; Boring, 739 P.2d at 885.

The Colorado court stated that
[f]rom the admitted facts, which are that defendant was
in control of an automobile which collided with the rear
end of plaintiff's automobile without any fault whatever
on the part of the plaintiff, there is a presumption of
negligence sufficient to make a prima facie case. "The
thing itself speaks," or the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies here, for the simple season [sic] that
the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to account
for any cause of the accident not within his knowledge.
Bettner, 764 P.2d at 832 (quoting Iacino v. Brown, 121 Colo. 450,
217 P.2d 266, 268 (Colo. 1950)); Boring, 739 P.2d at 884-85.
Because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is recognized in
Utah,

and

the

application
accepted

of

rear-end
the

in Utah.

collision

doctrine,

the

Accordingly,

presumption
presumption

the trial

is

simply

should

court's

an

also

ruling

be
was

incorrect as a matter of law.
C.

Plaintiff
Was
Instruction*

Entitled

To

A

Rear-End

Collision

It is well settled that a party is entitled to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case.

Jorqensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d

80, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); accord Carpet Barn, 786 P.2d at 775.
The trial court has the duty to cover the theories of both parties
in its instructions.

Pacific Chromalox Division, Emerson Electric

Co. v. Irev, 787 P.2d 1319, 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
raised

this presumption

as expressing

her

theory

Plaintiff

of the

case

throughout the trial proceedings.
"Once the elements of res ipsa loquitur have been established,
the plaintiff is entitled to a res ipsa loquitur instruction, and
24

it becomes the jury's function, not the trial court's, to weigh
conflicting evidence."

Virginia S., 741 P.2d at 671; accord Kusy,

681 P.2d at 1235; Anderton, 607 P.2d at 833. A plaintiff who makes
a

prima

facie

case

of

negligence

is

entitled

to

a rear

end

collision instruction.
Plaintiff made a prima facie showing sufficient to entitle her
to a rear-end presumption instruction.

She showed that she was

involved in an accident in which she was travelling northbound on
1-15

in the center

lane, where she had

a right to be.

She

testified that she was travelling at a reasonable speed for the
conditions, and that she did not stop unexpectedly on the roadway.
There is no dispute that defendant Sharp came up behind her, at a
faster rate of speed than she was travelling, could not stop or
slow down in time, and hit the rear of her vehicle.

The following

vehicle was undisputably under the exclusive control of defendant
Sharp.

Third, plaintiff's testimony sets forth evidence that the

accident occurred irrespective of her participation.
simply ran into her.

Mr. Sharp

This showing constitutes a prima

facie

showing of the elements of res ipsa loquitur under Virginia S. and
other Utah precedents, as well as a prima-facie showing sufficient
to justify a rear-end collision instruction under Bettner.
"Even when a plaintiff is contributorily negligent, he is
entitled

to

the

rear-end

Boring, 739 P. 2d at 885.

collision

presumption

instruction."

That the jury might find that neither

party was negligent begs the question; if the parties' evidence
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entitles him to a res ipsa instruction or, similarly, to a rear-end
collision instruction, he does not lose that entitlement because of
what the jury
Accordingly,
determine

found or might find,

the

jury's

whether

finding

plaintiff

Kusy, 681 P. 2d at 1235,

in the present

should

have

been

case does

entitled

to

not
the

requested instruction.
This application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not
violate Utah's ruling against finding negligence as a matter of law
in a rear end collision because the instruction is a means of
presenting the leading car's theory of the case to the jury and,
even though the driver may be entitled to an instruction, whether
the presumption applies is the jury's province to determine.

"When

a rear-end collision instruction is given to the jury, the jury is
instructed that the presumption is rebuttable."
at 832.

"[0]nce the elements of res ipsa

Bettner, 764 P.2d

loquitur have been

established, it merely permits and does not compel the inference of
negligence by the fact finder."

Kusy, 681 P. 2d at 1235; accord

Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah 1985).
the presumption

instruction

Thus, the use of

does not deprive the

jury

of

the

deliberative function so highly regarded by the Utah court.
D.

The Trial Court's Failure To Give Plaintiff's Requested
Instruction Was Reversible Error.

"Failure to give requested instructions is reversible error if
it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining
party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the
law."

Jorgensen, 739 P.2d at 82; accord Knapstad, 774 P.2d at 3.
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"Where there is evidence adduced to support a party's theory of the
case, it is prejudicial error for the trial court to fail to
instruct thereon." Watters, 626 P. 2d at 458. Further, "[a]n error
is reversible if there is a reasonable likelihood that a more
favorable result would have been obtained by the complaining party
in the absence of the error."

Harris, 671 P.2d at 222.

Where the evidence supports the giving of a requested rear-end
collision

instruction,

trial

courts

have

been

found

to

have

committed reversible error in refusing to give the instruction.
See, e.g., Boring, 739 P.2d at 885.
by refusing to include a rear-end

The Oklahoma court found that
collision

instruction,

"the

applicable law on the issues was withheld from the jury and gives
rise to a probability that jurors were misled, thereby reaching a
different conclusion than they would have, but for the refusal to
give the proposed instruction."

Cimarron Feeders v. Tri-County

Electric Coop., 818 P.2d 901, 903 (Okla. 1991).
In the present case, the court's failure to give the plaintiff's requested rear-end presumption instruction had the result of
failing to present plaintiff's theory of the case to the jury, so
insufficiently advised the jury as the law.

Plaintiff adduced

evidence to support this theory, yet the trial court failed and
refused to give the requested instruction.

These factors alone,

indicate that the trial court committed reversible error. Further,
because the instruction could have had the effect of shifting the
burden of proof had the jury found it applicable, there is a
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reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would have been
obtained in the absence of the error. Accordingly, the trial court
committed reversible error, so its judgment should be reversed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRESENTING AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
THEORY TO THE JURY.
A.

Unavoidable Accident Instructions May Not Be Used Under
Any Circumstances In Utah.

In Randle v. Allen, 22 3 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6, the Utah Supreme
Court struck down the use of unavoidable accident instructions.
The Randle court observed that an unavoidable accident instruction
"is not necessary, runs the risk of misleading

the jury, and

suggests that an improper type of analysis might be used to decide
a

case."

Id.

at

9.

The

court, accordingly,

instructions for use under any circumstances.

Id.

rejected

such

at 10.

The instruction struck down in Randle stated:
In the law we recognize what we term as unavoidable
or inevitable accidents.
These terms do not mean
literally that it was not possible for such an accident
to be avoided.
They simply denote an accident that
occurred without having been proximately caused by
negligence.
Even if such an accident could have been
avoided by the exercise of exceptional foresight, skill
or caution, still no one may be held liable for injuries
resulting from it.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
B.

The Theory Of Unavoidable Accident Was Presented To The
Jury.

During both the empanelling and instruction of the jury, the
trial court gave it several instructions which contained or were,
in essence, instructions on the theory of unavoidable or inevitable
accident.
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The court, while empanelling the jury, made the following
statement regarding the parties' theories of the case:
This is an action for personal injury brought by the
plaintiff, Anna Anderson, against Leonard Sharp, as a result
of an automobile accident. Plaintiff claims that as she was
traveling northbound on Interstate 15 near the point of the
mountain the defendant negligently and carelessly drove his
vehicle into the rear of her car, causing her injuries.
The defendant, Mr. Sharp, alleges the accident was not
the result of his negligence and it was due to the existing
weather conditions and plaintiff's own negligence.
(T. 9) (emphasis added).

Although the word "unavoidable" was not

included, it was implied in the emphasized language, and sets forth
defendant's

unavoidable

accident

theory.

The

trial

court's

presentation of this language to the jury could have done nothing
else

but

convey

to the

jury

the

impression

that

this was a

permissible theory of the case.
Instruction No. 9, which the trial court presented to the jury
after the presentation of the evidence stated, in part, that "[t]he
mere fact that the events complained of occurred does not support
an inference that any party to this action was negligent."

The

wording of this instruction also implies an unavoidable accident
theory

of non-liability.

The wording

of this

instruction

is

substantially similar to the wording disapproved of by the Utah
Supreme Court in Randle v. Allen, 223 U.A.R. at 6, less the express
words, "unavoidable accident."
Defendant's counsel made it clear throughout the trial that
unavoidable accident was his theory of the case.

He moved for a

directed verdict on this basis, "contrary to what's been discussed
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so far regarding the recent case of Randall [sic] versus Allen,"
(T. 203) , and excepted to the trial court's refusal to give his
unavoidable accident instruction on the ground that he felt that
Randle was wrongly decided.
This theory was, not surprisingly, incorporated by defense
counsel into his closing argument, which provided, in part, as
follows:
What else is the next instruction? And if you read all
of that stuff — I'm not saying you need to read it all, but
please, please for Mr. Sharp, read this sentence. "The mere
fact that the event complained of occurred does not support an
inference that any party to this accident was negligent." It
doesn't. And that's all we have in this event, as you know is
the fact that the accident occurred. . . .
. . . Well he's traveling too fast for the conditions.
That's what he did wrong. What happened when the conditions
changed, when the snow plow threw it threw it [sic] or
whatever? We know what the point is like. He didn't wait for
the car to come out after there was a danger. He started to
do what any of us would do. He started to slow down. As a
matter of fact, he didn't want to get into that situation
ahead of him so he did slow down. Then she comes out of the
cloud because she's braking.
The car is ahead of her.
A
situation that she — and I think what they're doing, both of
them is relatively the same . . . so she's braking to avoid
cars in front of her, just like he's braking not just to avoid
cars, but on the off chance what happens is going to happen,
the car comes out and he's already prepared and already
braking and already slowing down but didn't get quite slowed
enough and he bumps.
What did he do wrong?
If you read
through the next instructions that tells you what he has to do
. . . 15 states when a person without carelessness or
fault is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with peril —
and it goes on to say you're not held to the same standard.
If you're in a situation like that that arose quickly because
of the snow, you do the best you can. If you had created that
situation, then we could pont the finger at them.
Again,
unlike other rear end accidents this is different and the real
inference is, oh, he hit her from behind, it's [sic] his
fault. And the truth is normally you are. You're in city
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traffic, not leaving a proper following distance, any number
of reasons.
But this is a case not like other accidents.
Where is that burden? How can I rebut other than to say, well
it happened the way it happened . . .
. . . She may have seen the accident coming — not that
she saw him doing anything wrong, but she knew she was in a
dangerous situation. Accidents like that happen all the time.
(T. 224-25, 227-29, 230)
Despite plaintiff's counsel's objections, the court instructed
the jury and allowed defense counsel to present an unavoidable
accident theory of the case.
C.

The Jury Was Confused By The Presentation Of The
Unavoidable Accident Theory To Plaintiff's Prejudice.

Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Howard, objected specifically and at
length to the jury instructions as a whole, and to many of the
specific

instructions, on the basis that they were redundant,

duplicative, and overly and unfairly emphasized defendant's theory
of the case.
Unfair emphasis was considered in Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

The court stated:

In Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d
422 (1968) , as well as several other cases, the Utah
Supreme Court has recognized that
the more basic reason for criticizing such an
[unavoidable accident] instruction is that it is a
duplication.
Inasmuch as the jury is elsewhere
advised that the defendant's negligence must be
proved, and that in the absence of such proof of
negligence he is not liable, it is unnecessary to
state again that if the accident was unavoidable
because not caused by negligence, he is not liable.
Ames, 846 P.2d at 72.

The Randle court concurs:
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Apart from the inherent confusion in an unavoidable
accident
instruction,
the
instruction
tends
to
reemphasize the defendant's theory of the case, that the
defendant was not negligent.
To that extent, the
instruction constitutes an inappropriate judicial comment
on the evidence and could be viewed by the jury as a
"you-should-find-for-the-defendant" type of instruction.
Randle, 223 U.A.R. at 9.

This is an additional reason why the

court committed reversible error.

The court, in essence, provided

an improper reemphasis of defendant's theory of the case, thus
serving to further confuse the jury.
D.

An Unavoidable Accident Instruction Is Particularly
Confusing Where The Evidence Indicates One Or More Of The
Parties May Have Been Negligent.

The

Randle

court

stated

that

an

unavoidable

accident

instruction, while never acceptable, was even more confusing when
given "when the evidence clearly establishes that one or more of
the parties might be at fault."

Randle, 223 U.A.R. at 10.

The

evidence in this case indicates that the plaintiff was travelling
at a reasonable rate of speed for the conditions.
evidence,

even

from

defendant's

testimony,

There is no

that plaintiff

stopped or slowed down immediately prior to the accident.

had
His

vision was then momentarily obscured, he braked as he observed he
was overtaking plaintiff, and then slammed into her.

Such evidence

establishes at least a substantial possibility that one or both of
the

drivers

accident

might

have

instruction

been

even

at

more

fault, making

an

confusing

the

consequently, even more impermissible.

to

unavoidable
jury

and,

Further, the Utah Court of

Appeals, in Ames v. Maas, 846 P. 2d at 474, indicated that the
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giving of an unavoidable accident instruction in a weather-related
highway

accident

case

was

improper

because

"hazardous

winter

driving conditions in northern Utah are not unusual or unexpected."
Id. at 474. This provides yet another reason why the trial court's
instruction of the jury was erroneous.
E.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error In Presenting
The Unavoidable Accident Theory To The Jury.

The Utah appellate courts "review a trial court's instructions
under a correction of error standard."

Ames, 846 P. 2d at 471.

"The test upon review of an improper instruction is ^whether there
is a probability that the jurors were misled and thereby reached a
different result than they would have reached but for the error.'"
Anknev v. Hall, 764 P.2d 153, 155 (Okl. 1988).

There is no doubt,

based upon the reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court in Randle, and
the present facts, that there is a substantial probability that the
jurors were misled and, thereby, reached a different result than
they would have reached but for the error.

Accordingly, plaintiff

is entitled to a reversal of the trial court's judgment.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT JUDGMENT NOV OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL TO PLAINTIFF.
A.

Plaintiff Is Entitled To Judgment NOV.

Under Utah R. Civ. P. 50, a trial court should grant a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, it finds
that no competent evidence supports the verdict.

King v. Fereday,

739 P.2d 619, 628 (Utah 1987); accord Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d
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693, 695 (Utah 1982); Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown
& Gunnell, Inc.. 784 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Further,

such a judgment can be granted only when the losing party
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

is

Hansen v. Stewart, 761

P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). M A motion for a directed verdict will not
be sustained if the evidence allows reasonable persons to reach
different

conclusions

on the

issues

in controversy."

Little

America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982).

For

such a motion to succeed, the moving party "must marshal all the
evidence supporting the verdict" and then show that the evidence
cannot support the verdict.

Hansen, 761 P. 2d at 17. The appellate

court must apply this same standard in reviewing a trial court's
determination on this issue.

King, 739 P.2d at 620.

Plaintiff moved for judgment NOV on the grounds that there is
a presumption that a defendant is negligent when, in the absence of
the

plaintiff's

negligence,

he

or

she

rear-ends

plaintiff's

vehicle, and that the evidence presented by defendant failed to
rebut this presumption.

The evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to defendant, supports judgment for plaintiff.
The rear-end collision doctrine is directly applicable to
plaintiff's theory and the facts of this case.

Plaintiff's theory

of the case was, essentially, that she was rear-ended by defendant
without any fault, whatsoever, on her part.
Leonard Sharp's testimony, taken in the light most favorable
to him, indicates that he observed Mrs. Anderson's vehicle and the

34

snow plow at some distance ahead of him, which he estimated to be
between 150 feet to a mile. According to Mr. Sharp, Mr. Anderson's
vehicle and the snowplow were adjacent to each other at the time he
saw them.
plow.

He did not observe Mrs. Anderson to ever pass the snow

Even though he did not have a specific estimate of how fast

the snow plow or Mrs. Anderson were travelling, he observed that
his speed of fifty to fifty-five miles per hour was faster than
that of the snow plow and that of Mrs. Sharp, because he was
gaining on them.

In fact, he was becoming concerned enough about

gaining on Mrs. Sharp that he had planned to change into the left
lane to pass her after the car in the left lane passed him, just
prior to the collision.

Mr. Sharp also acknowledged that it was

within his range of experience that snow plows occasionally hit
snow and plow it, and that snow could fly.

Both parties7 testimony

indicates that it was windy and snow was blowing at the time.
Even

taking

Mr.

Sharp's

testimony

that

he

couldn't

help

hitting Mrs. Anderson's vehicle because it was temporarily obscured
by blowing snow from the snow plow as true, Mr. Sharp has not
provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence
Mrs. Anderson was entitled to under the circumstances.
To

rebut

a presumption

presumption doctrine dicussed

of

negligence

under

the

rear-end

in Section I of this Brief, the

defendant must show that the leading driver was negligent or that
there was otherwise no reason to anticipate the driver's conduct.
Hahn, 611 P. 2d at 67-68.

Nothing in Mr. Sharp's testimony could be
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construed to show that Mrs. Anderson was negligent.

Mr. Sharp's

testimony did not establish that Mrs. Anderson was stopped in the
middle of the freeway.

Even if Mrs. Anderson had been travelling

at a substantially slower rate of speed than Mr. Sharp, as his
testimony suggests, Mr. Sharp, himself, was well aware of that fact
according

to

his

testimony

and,

further,

also

slowed

down

substantially himself, as soon as it became obvious that his speed
was too fast for the conditions.

Mr. Sharp, therefore, has failed

to bring forth any evidence that Mrs. Anderson was negligent, or
that he was doing anything other than failing to travel at a speed
reasonable under the conditions. Mr. Sharp, accordingly, failed to
rebut

the

presumption

to

which

plaintiff

is

accordingly, cannot prevail as a matter of law.

entitled,

and,

The trial court,

therefore, committed reversible error in denying plaintiff's Motion
for Judgment NOV.
B.

Alternatively, Plaintiff Is Entitled To A New Trial,

"A trial court's grant or denial of a motion for a new trial
will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."
Knight v. Ebert, 824 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

n

[T]he

trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial unless the
moving party shows at least one of the circumstances specified in
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.11

Schindler v.

Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord Crookston
v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 802-03 (Utah 1991).
59(a), in relevant part, states:
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Rule

(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a
new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on
all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment
if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings
and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.

(7)

Error in law.

It has been observed that the standard to be applied by the
trial court in determining to grant a motion for judgment NOV is
stricter than the standard for deciding to grant a new trial.

"A

j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the losing party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.

On the other hand, a new trial may

be granted whenever there is evidence that would have permitted
entry of a judgment for a losing party."

Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17.

After entry of the judgemnt in defendant's favor, plaintiff
moved, alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59(a).

The trial

court denied plaintiff's Motion.
The grounds upon which plaintiff asserted that a new trial
should be granted fall under subsections (1) and (7) of the Rule,
and include the following:
11

(1)

Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or

adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by
which

either

party

was

prevented
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from

having

a

fair trial."

Plaintiff

alleged

before

the

trial

court,

and

has

set

forth

arguments in this brief, that the trial court erred by (a) failing
to

instruct

presumption

the
theory

jury

as

to

of the

plaintiff's

case, when

rear-end

plaintiff

had

collision
presented

sufficient evidence to be entitled to such an instruction, and (b)
giving

unbalanced

effect

of

and unnecessary

confusing

and

instructions, which

misleading

the

jury.

These

had

the

errors

constitute irregularities in the proceeding of the court, improper
orders of the court, and abuses of discretion on the part of the
court.

They justify the granting of a new trial.

"(7)

Error in law."

The trial court failed to properly

instruct the jury as to plaintiff's rear-end negligence theory of
the

case

on

the

erroneous

grounds

that

such

instruction

was

contrary to Utah law, and improperly allowed the jury to consider
an unavoidable accident theory in violation of Randle v. Allen, 223
U.A.R.

at

6,

thereby

misleading

the

jury

as

to

the

law

and

entitling plaintiff to a new trial.
Should this Court find that any one of these allegations of
error constitute reversible error, it should also find that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for
a new trial, and reverse and remand for a new trial.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO HAVE
COSTS TAXED BY THE COURT.
A.

Taxing of Deposition Costs Is An Exception To Rule 54(d).

This issue revolves around the interpretation and scope of
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d), the basic statutory provision regarding the
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taxing of costs, with respect to the taxing of deposition costs.
Rule 54(d), in relevant part, states:
Except
either in a
costs shall
party unless

when express provision therefor is made
statute of this state or in these rules,
be allowed as of course to the prevailing
the court otherwise directs; . . . .

The Utah courts have generally interpreted Rule 54(d) very
narrowly

in

provisions.

determining

what

costs

are

allowable

under

its

The leading case on this issue is Frampton v. Wilson,

605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), in which the Utah Supreme Court limited
costs for witness fees and subpoenas to only the amount allowed by
statute, and then refused to allow the cost of any

litigation

expenses, including models and expert witness fees, because they
were

not

ennumerated

in

any

statute

or

rule,

precluded by the express wording of the statute.

and,

so, were

.Id. at 774.

The

court stated, "the generally accepted rule is that it (Rule 54(d))
means those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to
witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be included in
the judgment."

Id.

The court thus distinguished between "the

legitimate and taxable x costs' and other * expenses,' of litigation
which may be ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable as
costs."

Id.

Nevertheless, the Frampton court made an exception to the rule
and allowed the costs of depositions under certain circumstances.
Deposition costs were allowed "subject to the limitation that the
trial court is persuaded that they were taken in good faith and, in
light of the circumstances, appeared
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to be essential

for the

development and presentation of the case."

IcL

Deposition costs

must "relate to the examination of witnesses whose testimony is
deemed essential to the trial, and taken for potential use as
testimony at trial."

Jd.

Deposition costs have been found to be

necessary and reasonable "where the development of the case is of
such a complex nature that discovery cannot be accomplished through
the

less

expensive

method

of

interrogatories,

requests

for

admissions and requests for the production of documents," or where
the

depositions

were

actually

used

in

court."

Highland

Construction Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , 683 P.2d 1043, 1051
(Utah 1984) .

That this is an exception to the otherwise clear

language of the rule is shown by the strict limitation put on it by
Frampton:

The taxing of depositions "was not intended and should

not be taken as opening the door to other expenses of the character
here claimed by the plaintiff as costs."

Frampton, 605 P. 2d at

774.
The Utah appellate courts have allowed the taxing of costs in
several cases.

For example, in Lawson

Supply

Co. v. General

Plumbing and Heating, Inc. . 27 Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d
1972) , costs

were

allowed

for

three

depositions,

607

two

of

(Utah
the

defendants and one of the general contractor involved, on the basis
that one of the facts discovered in the depositions was important
in the

development

of

the

case.
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Id.

at

610.

Two

of

the

depositions

were

unnecessarily7

not

while

used

in

court,

the witness was

and

the

third

in court.

was

Id.

used

at 611,

(Henriod, J. , dissenting). Likewise, in Highland Construction Co.,
683 P. 2d at 1042, the court found that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding deposition costs because
[t]he complexity of a construction case and the theories
of recovery sought to be used here made it virtually
impossible to obtain sufficient information for the
preparation of the case through more conservative methods
of discovery.
Moreover, the depositions were used at
trial on cross-examination, both to impeach veracity and
to refresh memory.
Id. at 1051-52.
On the other hand, the Utah courts have not taxed the costs of
depositions in several cases, although the factual situations are
not substantially different from those cases in which it taxed the
cost of depositions.

For example, in Hull v. Goodman, 4 Utah 2d

163, 290 P.2d 245 (1955), the cost bill at issue included three
depositions of witnesses who appeared at trial, two of whom were
the plaintiff's witnesses and one of whom was the defendant.

The

Utah Supreme Court disallowed these costs, stating that "[n]othing
is made to appear in the instant case to justify the inclusion of
the depositions above referred to in the costs awarded to the
plaintiffs." Id. at 247. Similarly, in Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d
601 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court
erred in awarding costs of taking depositions.

7

The court stated

In Justice Henriod's opinion, as reflected in his dissent in Lawson Supply Co. v. General
Plumbing and Heating. 493 P.2d at 611.
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that "the critical consideration is that the depositions were not
used by defendant during the course of the trial, and he presented
no evidence that the costs of these depositions were necessarily
incurred for the preparation of defendant's case." Xd. at 604. In
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) , deposition costs were not allowed, even
though the claiming party argued that both parties anticipated one
of the witnesses would be unavailable to testify at trial, and
portions of another witness's deposition were used at trial.

Id.

at 512.
B.

The Deposition Cost Exception To Rule 54(d) Should Be
Abandoned By This Court.

Taxing deposition costs is not explicitly provided for in the
Utah statutes, thereby making the award of such costs an exception
to the otherwise strictly construed Rule 54(d).

There are a number

of compelling reasons why this exception should be abandoned by
this Court:
1.
Rule.

The exception does violence to the express wording of the

Rule 54(d) expressly disallows the taxing of costs against

procedural rules.

Deposition costs are not addressed in any Utah

statute or procedural

rule.

This Court has allowed

no other

exceptions to this rule, even though there are many other necessary
costs of litigation.

Under rules of statutory interpretation, it

is improper to include anything that is expressly excluded.

Doing

such amounts to judicial legislation, which is strictly prohibited
by the separation of powers provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions.
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Justice Henriod,

in his dissent to Lawson

Supply

Co, v.

General Plumbing and Heating, 493 P. 2d at 610, recognized this
problem, stating,

"[This issue] is a product of none of this

court's business, amounts to judicial legislation, and is bottomed
on no legitimate authority save our own ipse dixit."
(Henriod, J., dissenting).

Id. at 610

He further noted that

There is absolutely nothing in our statutes having to do
with depositions being assessable as costs. There was
nothign there before the rules were promulgated and it
seems clear from Rule 54(d) and the compiler's notes that
no change was intended to include depositions as costs
where they did not exist before.
Id. at 610.
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Redevelopment Agency of Salt
Lake City v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), followed
similar

reasoning

in

holding

that

expert

witness

fees

in

a

condemnation action were not reimburseable costs under the relevant
statutes, including Rule 54(d), even though such costs were clearly
necessary

and

substantially

diminished the value of the condemnee's judgment.

The Daskalas

court

to defend

cited

Container

with

Co.,

"compensation

approval

263

for

the condemnation

S.E.2d

such

action

Department
830,

costs

831

incurred

of

Transp.

(1980),
by

a

v.

Winston

which

stated,

landowner

in

a

condemnation action is a matter of legislative prerogative and must
be provided for by statute."

Id. at 1123

(emphasis added).

The

Daskalas court concluded, "If an adjustment in the law of eminent
domain is dictated by fairness in this connection, it is a matter
for consideration and action by the [legislature].
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Id. at 1124.

2.

The standards set forth in Frampton for determining which

depositions should be taxed are unworkable.
The outcomes of similar cases are inconsistent.

Notably,

although the depositions were not used at trial in Lawson, Nelson,
and Lloyd's Unlimited, deposition costs were taxed in Lawson. but
were disallowed
Unlimited,

in Nelson

and Lloyd/d

Unlimited.

753 P. 2d at 512, the court disallowed

In

Lloyd's

the cost of

depositions, even though the plaintiff had claimed that they had
been essential for the development and presentation of the case.
In contrast, the court upheld an award of deposition costs where
the case and the theories of recovery were of a complex nature, and
the depositions were used at trial."
683 P.2d at 1051-52.

Highland Construction Co.,

Thus, there is substantial inconsistency in

the application of the Frampton standard to actual cases.
Further, it is impossible to tell in advance of taking a
deposition, or even after the taking of the deposition but prior to
the court's ruling, whether the costs of a deposition may
taxable.

be

This is because it is impossible to the trial court's

determination of ultimate necessity of a deposition before the
contents of the deposition are known and the court has ruled.

In

other words, the Frampton standards are arbitrary, making

the

exception untenable.
3.

The exception is inconsistent with the rule that other

necessary costs of litigation are disallowed.
there

are

many

expenses

of

litigation
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As Frampton notes,

which

are

"ever

so

necessary," but are not taxed.

Frampton, 605 P. 2d at 774. Justice

Henriod notes that
[t]he argument that depositions should be taxed as costs
because necessary to prepare one's case, equally would be
appliable to expenses in hiring a private eye, taking a
trip to Acapulco to interview a witness, or the cost in
salary of the time consumed by a lovely Flossie Fosham
while taking dictation from her Simon Legree employer.
Fact is, most all cases can be developed on both sides by
use of interrogatories, requests for admissions, pretrial
conferences and the other discovery processes.
Lawson Supply Co., 493 P.2d at 611 (Henriod, J., dissenting).
4.

The exception

is not conducive

to

judicial

economy.

Without a clearly articulated or easily applicable standard of what
depositions are or are not allowed, this issue will continue to
arise in trial after trial, and appeal after appeal.
are time consuming, irritating and onerous.

These issues

To handle each case

consistently and fairly, each deposition should be examined, along
with any interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for
production of documents, in the context of the case as it actually
developed, to determine, after the fact, if the deposition was
really necessary and if the information could actually have been
obtained by less expensive means.

Such review by both the trial

court and the appellate court is expensive, as is the cost to the
parties of the attorneys' time spent in arguments on such issues.
This

exception

can do

nothing

more

than generate

substantial

expenses in case after case which, in all probability, will be
higher than the costs of the depositions sought to be taxed.

45

This

is a waste of judicial time and resources as well as that of the
parties.
5.

This

exception

results

in

fundamental

unfairness.

Justice Henriod accurately points out that
ft]he litigant with means effectively can force an unfair
settlement with the deposition, if it can be taxed as
costs.
It can be an implement of imbalance, like
weighing a baseball bat on one plate of the scales of
justice against a toothpick on the other.
The mere
threat of taking depositions, if they could be taxed as
costs, would lead a poor litigant to an undeserved,
unfair, and unconscionable settlement and to the
bankruptcy court if he happened to lose,
and it is
pretty difficult these days to buy sure-win insurance.
Lawson Supply Co., 493 P.2d at 611 (Henriod, J., dissenting).
This reasoning has been recognized by the majority of the Utah
Supreme Court.

In Highland Construction Co. , 683 P. 2d at 1051,

this court stated, "The award of costs should be narrowly made to
guard against abuse by those better financially equipped lest costs
of seeking

justice become prohibitive

equipped."

.Id. at 1051.

for the

financially

ill

For these reasons, this Court should abolish the depositon
exception to the disallowance of nonstatutory
54(d).

costs under Rule

It should, consistent with this finding, also reverse the

trial court's award of costs against plaintiff in this action.
C.

In The Alternative, Defendant Has Failed To Justify Any
Award Of Costs Under Rule 54(d).

In the event that this Court should continue to uphold the
deposition costs exception to Rule 54(d), defendant has not carried
his burden of proof sufficiently to justify an award of costs.
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As discussed above, to justify an award of deposition costs,
the nature of the case must be so complex that other means of
discovery are ineffective, the depositions are otherwise necessary
to the factual development of the case, or the depositions were
taken

for

use

in

court.

M

[T]he

party

seeking

the

cost

of

depositions bears the burden of proving that the depositions were
reasonably necessary."

Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d at 686; accord

Highland Construction Co., 683 P.2d at 1051.
Defendant is demanding compensation for seven depositions in
his Bill of Costs, not four as stated in his Memorandum.

The case

is a simple negligence case with no complex theories of liability.
Defendant did not call as witnesses Michael Sabey, Greg DuVal, or
David Beaufort, yet demands deposition costs for all of them.
Further, defendant has not brought forth evidence, aside from his
conclusory allegations in his Bill of Costs, that deposition of any
of these parties was necessary, particularly

those of Michael

Sabey, Greg DuVal, and David Beaufort, who were not called as
witnesses by defendant.

Defendant has totally neglected to argue

or show that any of these depositions were required because less
expensive

means

of

discovery

were

inadequate.

Conclusory

statements, such as that put forth by defendant in his Memorandum
of Costs, are not sufficient.

See Birch Creek

Prothero, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 13 (1993) .8
8

Irrigation v.

This proposition is

Although Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13 deals with the issuance
of a temporary restraining order, the principle it is cited for, that supporting detail is necessary to
support a finding, is applicable to the present circumstance.
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supported by the Utah Court of Appeals in Morgan, 795 P.2d at 684.
The Morgan court stated:
Vera argues that the two depositions, for which she
seeks costs, were necessary "in order to verify that the
information obtained [from Wallace] was correct." In our
review of the record, we cannot determine if the trial
judge concluded that the deposition fees were reasonably
necessary. In the findings and conclusions and decree,
the deposition costs were simply awarded as part of the
overall attorney fees, without consideration of their
necessity. We therefore remand this issue to the trial
court to determine if the deposition costs were
reasonably necessary.
Id. at 687.

Because there was insufficient detail as to the

necessity of the costs of the depositions requested by defendant in
Morgan, the trial court's order awarding costs was overruled and
remanded.

Because defendant in the present case has failed to

address and carry his burden of proof, the present trial court
abused its discretion in making this award of costs to defendant.
This Court should, therefore, reverse the trial court's award of
costs in this matter.
D.

The Transcript From The Prior Trial Was Not A Reasonable
Expense Under The Rule.

Defendant

ordered

the transcript

from

the previous

trial

before any agreement was made to substitute the transcript for the
testimony of the witness.

Had each witness been called, all of

whom were plaintiff's witnesses, the defendant could not have been
awarded the cost of the transcript.
Although transcripts may, on occasion, be taxable as costs
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-8 (1993), defendant has not justified
the necessity of the transcript in view of his prior deposition of
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many of the witnesses, thereby making the transcript redundant
information and, accordingly, non-essential to the preparation of
the

case.

The

use

to

which

defendant

intended

to

put

the

transcript, prior to the parties' stipulation, is comparable in
nature to the "other expenses" of litigation which the court found
to be not properly taxable as costs.

Accordingly, this Court

should deny defendant's request for reimbursement of the costs of
transcribing the transcript, and reverse the trial court's order.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
trial court's verdict finding defendant not negligent and the trial
court's order taxing costs against plaintiff.

Plaintiff

also

requests a new trial on the issues of liability and damages, and an
award of costs and attorney fees incurred in bringing this appeal.
DATED this

day of September, 1994.

JACKSON HOWARD
Attorney for Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
September, 1994.
R. Phil Ivie,
David N. Mortensen,
Jeffery C. Peatross
IVIE & YOUNG
4 8 North University Ave.
P.O. Box 657

Provo, Utah
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 50,
Motion for a directed
notwithstanding the verdict.

verdict

and

for

judgment

(a)
Motion for a directed verdict; when made; effect.
A
party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence
offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the
motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do
and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made.
A
motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver
of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved
for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state
the specific ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting
a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of
the jury.
(b)
Motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all
the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court
is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a
later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion.
Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or if a directed
verdict was not returned such party, within ten days after the jury
has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his
motion for a directed verdict.
A motion for a new trial may be
joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the
alternative.
If a verdict was returned the court may allow the
judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new
trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict
had been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct
the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed
or may order a new trial.
(c)

Same:

Conditional rulings on grant of motion.

(1)
If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, provided for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is
granted, the court shall also rule on the motion for a new
trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if
the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall
specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a
new trial.
If the motion
for a new trial
is thus
conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the
finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new trial

i

has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court
has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has
been conditionally denied, the respondent on appeal may assert
error in that denial; and if the judgment is reversed on
appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the
order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than ten days
after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(d)
Same:
Denial of motion.
If the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on
that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a
new trial in the event the appellate court concludes that the trial
court erred in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in
this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to
determine whether a new trial shall be granted.
Rule 51.

Instructions to jury; objectons.

At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that
the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or
otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are to be
given in writing, all objections thereto must be made before the
instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be
made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but
before the jury retires to consider its verdict.
No party may
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction
unless he objects thereto.
In objecting to the giving of an
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the
foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and
in the interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to
give an instruction.
Opportunity shall be given to make
objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the
court has instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the
evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the evidence,

ii

it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of
all questions of fact.
Rule 54.
•

Judgments; costs.

• •

(d)

Costs.

(1)
To whom awarded.
Except when express provision
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs
of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final
determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah,
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent
permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must
within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a
memorandum
of
the
items
of
his
costs
and
necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements
have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding.
A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven
days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion
to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict,
or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the
entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served
and filed on the date judgment is entered.
Rule 59.

New trials; amendments of judgment.

(a) Grounds. Subject to all the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided,
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of
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discretion by which either party was prevented from having a
fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to
them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict
or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7)

Error in law.

(b)
Time for motion.
A motion for a new trial shall be
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a
new trial is made under Subdivision (a) (1) , (2) , (3), or (4), it
shall be supported by an affidavit.
Whenever motion for a new
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits.
The time within which the
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended
for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court
for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The
court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new
trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds
therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after
entry of the judgment.

iv

Utah Code Annotated 1993
§ 78-56-8. Transcripts — Impecunious defendant in criminal case - Transcript from electronic recordings.
(1)

(a) When a transcript has been ordered by the court, the fees
for transcribing shall be paid by the respective parties to
the action or proceeding in equal proportion, or in
proportions as the court orders.
A transcript may not be
taxed as costs, unless the preparation of the transcript is
ordered either by a party or by the court. The reporter is
not required in any case to transcribe notes until the fees
for this are tendered, or a sufficient amount to cover the fee
is deposited in court.
(b)
If the court determines that the defendant in a
criminal case is impecunious, the court shall order the
certified shorthand reporter to transcribe the notes requested
by the defendant. The cost of the transcribing shall be paid
under Section 77-56-5.

(2)
Transcripts from electronic recordings produced by a
certified court transcriber are governed under this section, and
compensation is at the same rates as under Section 78-56-4.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANNA ANDERSON,

SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 890401053
DATE: November 4, 1993

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
LEONARD SHARP,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Joe Morton
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

We, the jury in the above-entitled action, answer the questions submitted to us as
follows:
1. At the time and place of the incident in question and under the circumstances as
shown by the evidence, was the Defendant, Leonard Sharp, negligent?
Yes

No

V

If you marked "No" as the answer to Question 1 go no further. Date and sign the form and
return it to the Court. If you marked "Yes" proceed.
2. Was the negligence of the Defendant, Leonard Sharp, a proximate cause of the
incident?
Yes

No

If you marked "No" as the answer to Question 2 go no further. Date and sign this form and
return it to the Court. If you marked "Yes", proceed.

3. At the time and place of the incident in question and under the circumstances as
shown by the evidence, was the Plaintiff, Anna Anderson, negligent?
Yes

No

4. Only if you marked "Yes" as the answer to Question, answer this question. Was
the negligence of the Plaintiff, Anna Anderson, a proximate cause of the incident?
Yes

No

Only if you answered "Yes" to Questions 3 and 4, answer Question 5. If you marked "No"
to either Question 3 or 4, skip to Question 6.
5. Considering all the fault which caused the incident at 100%, what percentage of
that fault was attributable to:
A. The Defendant, Leonard Sharp

%

B. The Plaintiff, Anna Anderson

%

Total

100

%

If Plaintiffs percentage of negligence is 50% or more do not answer the following question.
Date and sign the form and return it to the Court. If the Plaintiffs percentage is less than
50%, proceed.
6. What sum would fairly compensate Plaintiff, for the damages, if any which she
sustained as a result of the incident?
A. For special damages

$

B. For general damages

$
Total

DATED AND SIGNED this

H

$

day of November 1993.

FOREPERSONS
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HOY
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, #5221
R. PHIL IVIE, #3657
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorney for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 657
Provo, Utah 84603
375-3000
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL
VERDICT

ANNA ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,

^ <y£r-V£'^3

vs.

Civil No. CV-8^=0*&i53

LEONARD SHARP,
Defendant.

Judge Ray M. Harding

The above-entitled matter was tried before a jury on
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of November, 1993. The parties were present
and represented by counsel, Jackson B. Howard, HOWARD, LEWIS &
PETERSEN, for plaintiff, and Jeffery C. Peatross, IVIE & YOUNG,
for the defendant.

Testimony was given, evidence introduced, and

arguments of counsel heard.
After retiring, the jury returned the following answers
to questions submitted on Special Verdict:
1. At the time and place of the incident in question
and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the
defendant Leonard Sharp negligent?
Yes

No

XXX

The jury having marked question number one no, did not
respond to the remaining Special Verdict questions.
The verdict was then dated and signed the 4th day of
November, 1993 by Mr. Norman L. Jones, foreperson.
Based upon the answers to the questions of the special
verdict, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Defendant is hereby awarded judgment against the
plaintiff, no cause for action, together with costs of Court to
be assessed hereafter in the amount of $ ^ .' CT> 1 ^ , pursuant to
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Judgment on Special Verdict with postage prepaid
thereon this

day of November, 1993, to the following:
Jackson B. Howard, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84606

Qrt/yul ^&ahjfA/uyU
£gcretary
SF618J27
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JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, #5221
R. PHIL IVIE, #3657
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 657
Provo, Utah 84603
375-3000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
AND DISBURSEMENTS

ANNA ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civxl NO. ~CV-0Q 040153-

LEONARD SHARP,

Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.
CLERK'S FEES:
date
06-18-89

to whom paid
Utah County Clerk

for
Jury Fee

fee
$50.00

WITNESS FEES:
name of witness
Michael Sabey*
Officer Michael Towers*
Sue Pratley*
Mary Staub*
Charlotte Flores*
Charlotte Flores
Sue Pratley
Mary Staub

place of
residence

mileage

Alpine
Am. Fork
Provo
Provo
Provo
Provo
Provo
Provo

15 miles
10 miles
1 mile
1 mile
1 mile
1 mile
1 mile
1 mile

fee
$ 20.00
17.00
17.00
17.00
17.00
17.00
17.00
17.00

WITNESS FEES:

(cont'd)

name of witness

place of
residence

Officer Michael Towers
Brent Pratley, M.D.
UVRMC
UVRMC
Brent Pratley, M.D.
Charles Smith, M.D.

Am. Fork
Provo
Provo
Provo
Provo
Provo

mileage
10
1
1
1
1
1

miles
mile
mile
mile
mile
mile

fee
17.00
17.00
17.00
14.00
14.00
14.00

* Fir* trial in August, 1992.

SERVICE FEES:
person
served

process server
UT. Cnty. Sheriff
Willis L. Vincent
UT. Cnty. Constable
Willis L. Vincent
Dave Carter, Cnstble
Dave Carter, Cnstble
Dave Carter, Cnstble
Dave Carter, Cnstble
UT. Cnty. Constable
Ut. Cnty. Constable

Michael Sabey
Officer Tower
C. Flores
Pratley/Staub
M. Staub
C. Flores
Officer Tower
S. Pratley
B. Pratley
UVRMC

paper
served

place of
service

fee

Subpoena
Subpoena
Subpoena
Subpoena
Subpoena
Subpoena
Subpoena
Subpoena
Subpoena
Subpoena

Alpine
Am. Fork
Provo
Provo
Provo
Provo
Am. Fork
Provo,
Provo
Provo

$ 18.75
48.00
9.00
24.00
9.00
9.00
21.00
9.00
12.00
12.00

DEPOSITIONSJ
date
05-02-91
05-02-91
04-04-91
10-21-91
11-25-91
11-25-91
07-06-92

court
reporter

deponent
Leonard Sharp
Anna Anderson
Michael Sabey
Greg DuVal
Leonard Sharp
Anna Anderson
David Beaufort

Lesley S. Nelson, C.S.R.
Lesley S. Nelson, C.S.R.
Myron A. Frazier, C.S.R.
Assoc. Prof. Reporters
Assoc. Prof. Reporters
Assoc. Prof. Reporters
Assoc. Prof. Reporters

2

fee
$107.45
107.45
147.00
39.40
39.40
233.70
97.02

TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS:

witness

date

Vol. I-III

08-92

court
reporter

fee

Creed Barker

925.00
TOTAL

STATE OF UTAH

$2,,100.17

)
SS.

County of Utah )
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, being duly sworn, says that he is
the attorney for the defendant in the above-entitled action, and
as such, is better informed relative to the above costs and
disbursements than the said defendant.

That the items contained

in the Memorandum are correct to best of the affiant's knowledge
and belief, and that the said disbursements have been necessarily
incurred in said action.
FERy<

u2*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

November, 1993.
NOTARY *Vtil iC
JAMS£L. MAYWA*;
° 'jvo, >Jt'^ 3 " - '
M,'Conm$s»o» »-'•

M

My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Utah County, Utah

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements, with
postage prepaid thereon, this 10** day of November, 1993, to:
Jackson B. Howard, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603

ecretar;
SF61&-1J27
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT V
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANNA ANDERSON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 89040153
DATE: December 2, 1993

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
LEONARD D. SHARP,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Joe Morton
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for ruling on Plaintiff's motions for Judgement
NOV or in the Alternative a New Trial, and to Tax Costs by the Court. Having received
and considered Plaintiff's Motions, together with memoranda both in support and in
opposition to the motions, the Court hereby denies the motions.
The Plaintiff first asks for Judgement NOV because the Court gave a jury instruction
on the "unavoidable accident". A closer reading of the jury instructions reveals that this
instruction was scheduled to be given in the first trial that ended in a mistrial. As discussed
with counsel, the Court recognized this instruction is now inappropriate and it was never
given to the jury in this case. Plaintiffs argument without foundation.
Plaintiff further argues that Court erred by not allowing her counsel to conduct voir
dire or supplement voir dire with reasonable questions. The Court allowed each counsel to
submit proposed voir dire questions in advance of trial From these the court selected those
it deemed "material and proper". In addition, at the conclusion of the Courts questioning,
each counsel was allowed to ask additional questions, which the plaintiffs counsel did. Voir
dire was conducted appropriately and in accordance with the statute.

Plaintiff finally argues that as a matter of law the Defendant should be presumed
negligent in rear-end collisions. This is not the law in Utah and the facts do not support
such a presumption in this case.
The Court finds the costs as submitted by the Defendant to be reasonable and
necessary and sets the amount at $2100.17.
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no
effect until such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 2>(0 day of December, 1993.

cc:

Jackson Howard, Esq.
Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq.

ii

Fourth !«*•: ^ =rr«ct Court
ofUtar•• Scumv **eofUtah
CARM* a. SMITH, CJ$J*<—N
/n-$~f>£
\S^ Deputy

JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, #5221
R. PHIL IVIE, #3657
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
(801) 375-3000
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ANNA ANDERSON,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

A>63

LEONARD D. SHARP,
Defendant.

Civil No. 890404*6—
Judge Ray M. Harding

The court having considered the Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment NOV or in the Alternative a New Trial and Plaintiff's
Motion to Tax Defendant's Cost Bill, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and
DECREES as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's Judgment NOV or in the Alternative a

New Trial is hereby denied for the reasons set forth in the
court's memorandum decision dated December 2, 1993 .
2.
also denied.

Plaintiff's Motion to Tax Defendant's Cost Bill is
The court finds defendant's cost bill to be

reasonable and necessary and awards costs in the amount of
$2,100.17.

Such costs are to be included in the space in

^i *J **

plaintiff's judgment, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
DATED AND SIGNED this *P

day of December, 1993.

BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form:

JACKSON HOWARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
' 07 S*

*.>-'
'^ .*
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Order with postage prepaid thereon this
day of December, 1993, to the following:

Jackson B. Howard
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601

Secretary^
SF618J28
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANNA L ANDERSON

JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 890401053
DATE: November 2, 1993

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M HARDING
LEONARD SHARP
Defendant,

REPT. BY: Creed Barker, CSR
CLERK: LLP, LCW, AAD

This matter came before the Court for jury trial in the above-entitled matter.
Jackson Howard appeared representing the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was present. Jeff
Peatross appeared representing the Defendant. The Defendant was present.
The jurors were sworn and qualified. Jurors Gregory John Waterhouse, Roselyn
Luke, and Merlin Dee Allen were excused by the Court.
The jurors were ten called, seated, and sworn and questioned as follows:
Phoebe B Thomas, Stephanie N Chischillie, Alice L Beck, Arthur D Cox, Vonda
Packer Bahr, Ralph Kent Gygi, Margaret Cope Daley, Pamela Captain Haws,
Garlen Lyle Johnson, Norman L Jones, Matthew S Shaw, Julie R Wilkinson,
Sherie J Cole, Kent T Purdy, Treg Sheldon Anderson, Ty Kenneth Briggs,
Paula Harrington Lifferth, Thais C Degrey, Nancy G Perl, Barbara Lynn May,
Ina D Davis, Glenna B Hansen, Jennifer Johnson, Kearney, Kristy Kaye Bushnell,
Kevin D Coleman, June M Larson, Berva Dawn Griffin.
Mr. Howard addressed further questions to the jurors. Mr. Peatross addressed
further questions to the jurors.
The jury was given the cautionary admonition and court recessed at 11:35 a.m.
Court held in chambers conference with jurors Ralph Kent Gygi and Ty Kenneth
Briggs.
Jurors Phoebe B Thomas and Ralph Kent Gygi were excused for cause.

Court resumed session at 11:56 a.m. with the jury panel seated and all parties ready
to proceed.
Counsel passed the jury for cause.
Peremptory challenges were taken.
The following jurors were called to serve as jurors in this cse, sworn, and seated as
follows:
Stephanie N Chischillie, Arthur D Cox, Margaret Cope Daley, Garten Lyle
Johnson, Norman L Jones, Julie R Wilkinson, Sherie J Cole, Treg Sheldon
Anderson.
Court then thanked and excused the jurors not chosen for this case.
Court recessed for lunch at 12:15 p.m.
Court resumed session at 1:25 p.m. with the jury seated and all parties ready to
proceed.
Court held a conference at the bench with counsel.
Mr. Jackson presented opening statements to the jury.
Mr. Peatross presented opening statement to the jury.
Plaintiff was sworn and testified on direct by Mr. Howard. Plaintiffs exhibit
number 42 (summary of medical expenses) was offered and received.
Cross by Mr. Peatross.
The jury was given the cautionary admonition and court recessed at 3:08 p.m.
Court resumed session at 3:31 p.m. with the jury seated and all parties ready to
proceed.
A stipulation was entered for the receipt of the Plaintiffs exhibits listed below.
Plaintiff s exhibits 1,2,4,5,6,9, 10,11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25,
41 were offered and received.
Continued cross of Plaintiff by Mr. Peatross. Defendant's exhibit #43 (Plaintiffs
affidavit) was offered and received. Defendant's exhibit #44 (Driver's statement) was
offered and received.

Defendant's exhibit #45 and #46 (photos) were offered and received.

Defendant's exhibit #47 (radiologist report) was offered and received.
Redirect by Mr. Howard. Plaintiffs exhibit #48 and was offered and received.
Plaintiffs exhibits number 32 through 35 were offered.
Mr. Peatross voir dired.
Plaintiffs exhibits number 32 through 35 were received.
Redirect continued.
Recross by Peatross.
Court gave the jury the cautionary admonition and recessed at 4:55 p.m. Court
will resume session at 10:00 a.m. on November 3, 1993.
November 4, 1993, 10:30 a.m.
Court resumed with the jury, counsel, and parties present and ready to proceed.
Jury instructions were read.
Closing statements were made to the jury by Mr. Jackson.
Closing statements were made to the jury by Mr. Petross.
Rebuttal presented by Mr. Howard.

November 3, 1993

Counsel met in chambers with the Court. Exhibit 49 marked.
Court reconvened with the jury seated and all parties ready to proceed.
Andrew Howard took the stand to assist in the reading of the transcript from the
previous hearing. The jury was excused so the counsel could address the Court regarding a
matter of law. The Court will permit the reading of the transcript of cross examination and
will not receive Exhibit #3. Mr. Howard made his objections for the record.
The jury was present and seated. Reading of the transcript continued.
Court gave the jury the cautionary admonition and recessed for lunch until 1:00

.% *

i

p.m.
The Court reconvened at 1:10 p.m. with the jury seated and all parties ready to
proceed.
The reading of the transcript continued. Discussion between the Court and counsel
regarding exhibit #7. The Court will allow the oversized exhibit #7 to be shown to the jury.
Exhibits #7 and #8 received. The Court will permit Exhibit #22 and #3 received into
evidence.
The Court gave the jury the cautionary admonistion and recessed for 10 minutes.
The court reconvened with at 3:25 with the jury seated and the parties ready to
proceed.
Mr. Howard preferred testimon of the plaintiff.
Roger Anderson sworn and testified on direct by Mr. Howard. Cross examination
by Mr. Peatross. Mr. Howard objected to the form of questioning. Objection sustained.
Anna Anderson recalled as a witness by Mr. Howard. The Court reminded Ms.
Anderson she was still under oath. Witness questioned by Mr. Peatross. Plaintiff rests.
Leonard Sharp sworn and testified on direct examination by Mr. Peatross. Cross
by Mr. Howard.
Glenda Sharp sworn and testified on direct examination by Mr. Peatross. Exhibit
49 offered. Cross examination by Mr. Howard. Mr. Howard objects to exhibit 49. The
Court will allow Exhibit 49 to be admitted.
The Court gave the jury the cautionary admonition and recessed at 4:35 p.m. The
Court will reconvene on November 4, 1993 at 10:00 a.m.
Mr. Peatross addressed the Court after the jury had exited the courtroom and
moved to dismiss the case. Mr. Howard responded. Court will take the motion under
advisement. The Court gave copies of the instructions to counsel to review

November 4, 1993
Court resumed with the jury, counsel, and parties ready to proceed.
The Court read the jury instructions.
Mr. Howard presented closing arguments to the jury.
Mr. Peatross presented his closing arguments to the jury.
The Court recessed the Jury to enter into deliberation.
Mr. Howard made an amended motion for directed verdict on the basis of prime
facie evidence.
The Court took the motion under advisement.
Court recessed.
Court resumed with the jury, counsel and parties present and ready to proceed.
The jury returned with a verdict in favor of the defendant.
The jury was polled.
Mr. Peatross is to prepare judgment.

INSTRUCTION NO. 3
In this case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
what, if any, negligent conduct the defendant committed, and that such negligence, if any, was
a proximate cause of injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The plaintiff also has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence what damages, if any she has sustained as a result
of the defendant's negligent conduct, if any.

INSTRUCTION NO. 4
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, in your minds,
seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing and satisfactory. The preponderance of
the evidence is not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but
by the convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you,
the jury.

INSTRUCTION NO. 5
The law does not permit you to base a verdict on speculation or conjecture as to the
facts. If the evidence does not preponderate in favor of the party making the claim or assertion,
then that party has failed to meet the burden of proof and yourfindingmust be against that party
on that issue.

INSTRUCTION NO. 6
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden of proof rests upon a certain
party, I mean that unless the truth of the allegation is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, you shall find that the same is not true. If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its
convincing force on any allegation, you must find that such allegation has not been proved.

INSTRUCTION NO. 7
You must weigh and consider this case without regard to sympathy, prejudice or passion
for or against either party to the action.

INSTRUCTION NO. 8
Insofar as you are concerned, you may consider as evidence whatever is admitted in the
trial as part of the record, whether it be the testimony of witnesses or an article or document
marked as an exhibit, or other matter admitted, such as an admission, agreement, or stipulation.
At times I have ruled upon objections to the admission of certain things into evidence.
Questions relating to admissibility of evidence are solely questions of law and you must not
concern yourself with my reasons for ruling as I have, or draw any inferences therefrom in favor
of or against either party. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, the Court doesnot determine what weight should be given such evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of
the witness. As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture
as to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection.
Statements, arguments, and remarks of counsel are intended to help you in understanding
the evidence and in applying the law, but they are not evidence. You should disregard any such
utterance that has no basis in the evidence, unless such statement was made as an admission or
stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts.
If the Court has said or done anything which has suggested to you that it is inclined to
favor the claims or positions of either party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by
any such suggestion. Neither in these instructions nor in any ruling, action, or remark that I
have made during the course of this trial have I intended to interpose any opinion or suggestion
as to how I would resolve any of the factual issues of this case.

INSTRUCTION NO. 9
In this case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent and
that such negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. The mere fact that the
event complained of occurred does not support an inference that any party to this action was
negligent.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in the natural and continuous
sequences, produces the injury, and without which the results would not have occurred. It is
the efficient cause — the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. It may operate directly or through intermediate agencies or through conditions created
by such agencies.
The law does not necessarily recognize only one proximate cause of damages incurred.
The acts and omissions of two or more persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of
any damages and in such case, each of the participating acts or omissions is regarded in law as
a proximate cause.
If you find that a party to this action was negligent, that party will not be liable unless
you also find that its negligence was the proximate cause of the damages.

INSTRUCTION NO. 10
Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have done
under the circumstances, or doing what such a person under such circumstances would not have
done. The fault may lie in acting or in omitting to act.
The person whose conduct we set up as a standard is not the extraordinary cautious
individual, nor the exceptionally skillftil one, but a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence,
While exceptional caution and skill are to be admired and encouraged, the law does not demand
them as a general standard of conduct.

J^J

INSTRUCTION NO. 16
Evidence consists of testimony of witnesses, writings, material objects, or anything
presented to the senses and offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact.
Evidence is either direct or circumstantial.
Direct evidence is evidence that directly proves a fact, without the necessity of an
inference, and which by itself, if found to be true, establishes that fact.
Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from which
an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn. And it is a deduction of fact that.
may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts established by the
evidence.
It is not necessary that facts be proved by direct evidence. They may be proved also by
circumstantial evidence or by a combination of direct evidence and circumstantial evidence.
Both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are acceptable as a means of proof. Neither
is entitled to any greater weight than the other.

INSTRUCTION NO. 20
Pursuant to the instructions and directions of the special verdict which is herewith
submitted to you, it will be your duty to determine the amount of Plaintiffs damages, if any,
as you may find from a preponderance of the evidence will reasonably and adequately
compensate Plaintiff for any injury and loss Plaintiff may have sustained as a result of the
incident and injuries complained of by Plaintiff.
In determining such damages, you may consider the nature and extent of the injuries
sustained by the Plaintiff, the degree and character of Plaintiff's suffering, both mental andphysical, its probable duration and severity, and the extent to which Plaintiff had been prevented
from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life theretofore enjoyed, and any disability or loss of
earning capacity resulting from such injury.
Pain and mental and physical suffering have no market value. They are not capable of
being exactly or accurately determined, and there is no fixed rule or standard whereby damages
for them can be measured. You may however make such award for pain and mental and
physical suffering as will provide an allowance looking toward recompense for or made because
of suffering resulting from the injury.
You may also consider whether any of the above will, with reasonable certainty, continue
in the future.
All of the foregoing are designated under the law as general damages, and in addition
thereto you may determine the amount of such reasonable special damages and expenses, if any,
as you find from a preponderance of the evidence the Plaintiff, with reasonable certainty, has

incurred for hospitalization, physicians, drugs, nurses, therapists, laboratory expenses,
orthopedic equipment, travel expenses connected with medical treatment, and other similar
expenses.
You are not permitted to award Plaintiff speculative damages by which term is meant
compensation for detriment which, although possible, is remote, conjectural or speculative.

INSTRUCTION NO. 26
It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate, with a view to
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. You
each must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after a consideration of the case
with your fellow jurors. You should not hesitate to change an opinion if convinced that it is
erroneous. However, you should not surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect
or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the
opinion of the other jurors.
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1

INSTRUCTION?

AND IF YOU READ ALL OF THAT STUFF —

2

NOT SAYING YOU NEED TO READ IT ALL, BUT PLEASE, PLEASE

3

FOR MR. SHARP, READ THIS SENTENCE.

4

THAT THE EVENT COMPLAINED OF OCCURRED DOES NOT SUPPORT

5

AN INFERENCE THAT ANY PARTY TO THIS ACCIDENT WAS

6

NEGLIGENT."

7

THIS EVENT, AS YOU KNOW IS THE FACT THAT THE ACCIDENT

8

OCCURRED.

9

MR. SHARP OF COURSE DOESN'T DENY THE ACCIDENT

IT DOESN'T.

I'M

"THE MERE FACT

AND THAT'S ALL WE HAVE IN

IT DID OCCUR AND THAT'S WHY WE'RE HERE AND

10

OCCURRED.

WHERE'S THE PROOF THAT HE DID ANYTHING

11

WRONG IN THIS CASE?

12

IT SEEM LIKE HIS STORY WAS INCONSISTENT OR DIDN'T HAVE

13

HIS FACTS STRAIGHT.

14

BELIEVES OR HOPED HAPPENED, BUT IT ISN'T WHAT

15

HAPPENED.

16

DRIVING NORTH, SAW WAY AHEAD OF ME.

17

CONTRADICTED HIMSELF AT ALL.

18

DISTANCE AT ONE POINT AS A FOOTBALL FIELD.

19

POINTED OUT HE HAD SAID 12 CAR LENGTHS BEFORE AND THAT

20

WAS ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF A FOOTBALL FIELD.

21

QUIT TRYING TO MAKE ME PIN IT DOWN TO FEET.

22

HAVE MY MEASURING TAPE.

23

I DON'T CARE IF IT WAS A HUNDRED YARDS OR 80 FEET,

24

THERE'S NO SHOWING HE FOLLOWED TOO CLOSE WHEN HE WAS

25

DRIVING ALONG.

AGAIN, MR. HOWARD TRIED TO MAKE

THAT MAY BE WHAT THE PLAINTIFF

WHAT DID HE TELL YOU?

HE TOLD YOU I WAS
HE NEVER

HE ESTIMATED THE
IT WAS

HE SAID
I DIDN'T

IT WAS A FINE, SAFE DISTANCE.

THERE'S NO PROOF OF THAT.

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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1

MOVE ON.

2

SNOW PLOW AND WE'VE GOTTEN CAUGHT UP IN:

3

IT OR NOT.

4

SHE DIDN'T PASS IT, SHE DIDN'T GO AROUND IT AND GO

5

DOWN THE ROAD.

6

STARTED TO PASS IT, AROUND THE BACK OF IT.

7

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

SHE GOES TO PASS THE
DID SHE PASS

MAYBE WE'RE PLAYING SEMANTICS.

I SAY WHEN

SHE CERTAINLY ATTEMPTED TO PASS IT OR

IT WASN'T MR. SHARP WHO SAID I STARTED

8

BRAKING WHEN I SAW THE DRIVER.

IT WASN'T MR. SHARP

9

WHO SAID IN HER DEPOSITION IF I WAS PAST HIM, IT WAS

10

FEET NOT BLOCKS.

THE ONLY PERSON THAT SUGGESTED TO

11

YOU THAT SHE WAS DOWN THE ROAD AND IN THE CLEAR OF THE

12

DANGER, WASN'T MRS. ANDERSON, IT WAS MR. HOWARD.

13

FIRST IN THE AFFIDAVIT —

14

PERSONALLY BUT FIRST IN THE AFFIDAVIT PREPARED BY HIS

15

FIRM AND SECOND IN THE SUGGESTIONS IN OPENING

16

STATEMENT, AND NOW AGAIN IN CLOSING, THAT SOMEHOW

17

SHE'S PAST HIM MINUTES AND SHE'S DOWN THE ROAD.

18

MAY HAVE SAID MINUTES —

19

STARTED PASSING HIM BUT NOWHERE DID SHE EVER SAY I'M

20

DOWN THE ROAD A THOUSAND YARDS.

21

BEEN ATTEMPTED TO BE CREATED BUT IT'S NOT HIS

22

TESTIMONY THAT REBUTS THAT, BUT HER VERY OWN

23

TESTIMONY.

24

ANOTHER PLACE WE CAN LOOK AND WHAT DID SHE TELL THE

25

OFFICER?

AND IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN HIM

SHE

IT HAD BEEN MINUTES THAT SHE

THE INFERENCE HAS

SHE SAID SHE WAS ALONGSIDE HIM.

THEN

YOU REMEMBER THAT EXHIBIT I HAD TO CUT THE

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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1

TOP OFF?

SHE'S NEXT TO THE SNOW PLOW, MAYBE A FEW

2

FEET IN FRONT.

3

WHAT MR. SHARP TOLD YOU IS COMPLETELY CONSISTENT.

4

SHE'S GONE NOW AND IN A CLOUD OF SNOW AND WHAT DOES HE

5

DO AT THAT POINT?

6

FAST IS HE TRAVELING?

7

MRS. ANDERSON IS TRAVELING, APPROXIMATELY 50, 50 MILES

8

AN HOUR.

9

BOTH OF THEM 50 MILES AN HOUR, 15 MILES AN HOUR SLOWER

I DON'T KNOW.

BUT GIVEN THAT FACT,

HE'S NOT TRAVELING TOO FAST.

HOW

HE'S TRAVELING THE SAME SPEED

REMEMBER THAT'S WHAT SHE SAID ON THE STAND.

10

THAN THE SPEED LIMIT.

WELL HE'S TRAVELING TOO FAST

11

FOR THE CONDITIONS.

12

HAPPENED WHEN THE CONDITIONS CHANGED, WHEN THE SNOW

13

PLOW THREW IT THREW IT OR WHATEVER?

14

POINT IS LIKE.

15

AFTER THERE WAS A DANGER.

16

OF US WOULD DO.

17

OF FACT, HE DIDN'T WANT TO GET INTO THAT SITUATION

18

AHEAD OF HIM SO HE DID SLOW DOWN.

19

OF THE CLOUD BECAUSE SHE'S BRAKING.

20

OF HER.

21

THEY'RE DOING, BOTH OF THEM IS RELATIVELY THE SAME

22

AND I'LL GET TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM IN A

23

MINUTE —

24

IN THE SAME SITUATION, SO SHE'S BRAKING TO AVOID CARS

25

IN FRONT OF HER, JUST LIKE HE'S BRAKING NOT TO JUST

THAT'S WHAT HE DID WRONG.

WHAT

WE KNOW WHAT THE

HE DIDN'T WAIT FOR THE CAR TO COME OUT
HE STARTED TO DO WHAT ANY

HE STARTED TO SLOW DOWN.

A SITUATION THAT SHE —

AS A MATTER

THEN SHE COMES OUT
THE CAR IS AHEAD

AND I THINK WHAT
—

BUT SHE'S DOING THE SAME THING HE HAS TO DO

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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1

AVOID CARS, BUT ON THE OFF CHANCE WHAT HAPPENS IS

2

GOING TO HAPPEN, THE CAR COMES OUT AND HE'S ALREADY

3

PREPARED AND ALREADY BRAKING AND ALREADY SLOWING DOWN

4

BUT DIDN'T GET QUITE SLOWED ENOUGH AND HE BUMPS.

5

DID HE DO WRONG?

6

INSTRUCTIONS THAT TELLS YOU WHAT HE HAS TO DO.

7

TRY TO GO THROUGH THIS AS QUICKLY AS I CAN.

8
9

WHAT

IF YOU READ THROUGH THE NEXT
I'LL

THE INSTRUCTIONS ENUMERATE WHAT PEOPLE HAVE
TO DO, A NUMBER OF THINGS:

DRIVING A SAFE SPEED -- GO

10

THROUGH THOSE ONE BY ONE AND ASK YOURSELVES:

11

MR. SHARP VIOLATE ANY OF THESE?

12

LITTLE BETTER IN HINDSIGHT?

13

DID

COULD HE HAVE DONE A

SURE ANY OF US COULD.

NUMBER 10, ASKS YOU WHAT A REASONABLE DRIVER

14

WOULD DO, NOT A AN EXCEPTIONAL OR PROFESSIONAL DRIVER.

15

DID HE DO WHAT A REASONABLE PERSON WOULD DO UNDER THE

16

CIRCUMSTANCES.

17

15 STATES WHEN A PERSON WITHOUT CARELESSNESS

18

OR FAULT IS SUDDENLY AND UNEXPECTEDLY CONFRONTED WITH

19

PERIL —

20

SAME STANDARD.

21

THAT AROSE QUICKLY BECAUSE OF THE SNOW, YOU DO THE

22

BEST YOU CAN.

23

WE COULD POINT THE FINGER AT THEM.

24

REAR END ACCIDENTS THIS IS DIFFERENT AND THE REAL

25

INFERENCE IS, OH, HE HIT HER FROM BEHIND, IT'S HIS

AND IT GOES ON TO SAY YOU'RE NOT HELD TO THE
IF YOU'RE IN A SITUATION LIKE THAT

IF YOU HAD CREATED THAT SITUATION, THEN
AGAIN UNLIKE OTHER

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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1

FAULT.

AND THE TRUTH IS NORMALLY YOU ARE.

YOU'RE IN

2

CITY TRAFFIC, NOT LEAVING A PROPER FOLLOWING DISTANCE,

3

ANY NUMBER OF REASONS.

4

OTHER ACCIDENTS.

5

REBUT OTHER THAN TO SAY, WELL IT HAPPENED THE WAY IT

6

HAPPENED.

7

STORY.

8

THOUSAND FEET DOWN THE ROAD.

9

THREE DIFFERENT TIMES, THAT SHE WAS ALONG THE SNOW

BUT THIS IS A CASE NOT LIKE

WHERE IS THAT BURDEN?

HOW CAN I

BOTH PARTIES ESSENTIALLY TELL THE SAME

IT'S ONLY MR. HOWARD WHO SAYS THEY'RE ALL A
PLAINTIFF SAID, AGAIN

10

PLOW, EITHER TO THE OFFICER, IN HER DEPOSITION AND THE

11

FIRST TRIAL.

12

THAT'S HER TESTIMONY.

I MIGHT POINT OUT ONE OTHER THING SHE SAID.

13

MR. HOWARD MAKES IT SOUND LIKE A NICE SUNNY DAY.

IT

14

MAY HAVE BEEN WHEN SHE STARTED OUT.

15

THAT SAID IT WAS BLINDING.

16

READ —

17

GOT ANOTHER TRANSCRIPT NOW.

18

WAS ASKED OF HER:

19

KIND OF BLINDING AND YOU WERE AFRAID YOU MIGHT STRIKE

20

SOMEONE IN FRONT OF YOU; IS THAT FAIR?

21

RESPONDED: "THAT'S FAIR."

22

NOTED THAT YOU KNEW YOU WOULD BE IN TROUBLE IF THERE

23

WAS ANYONE FOLLOWING YOU, YOU STATED THAT AS WELL?

24

YES" WAS HER ANSWER.

25

THAT THE REASON YOU KNEW YOU WOULD BE IN TROUBLE IS

BUT SHE'S THE ONE

AND WHAT I WANT TO DO IS

THIS IS FROM HER TESTIMONY YESTERDAY.

WE'VE

VERY BRIEFLY THE QUESTION

"BECAUSE TO USE YOUR TERM, IT WAS

AND SHE

THEN I ASKED, "AND ALSO YOU

"DON'T YOU THINK IN FAIRNESS

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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1

YOU KNEW THE VISIBILITY WAS SO POOR THAT A DRIVER

2

BEHIND YOU MAY NOT HAVE A CHANCE TO OBSERVE YOU

3

SLOWING DOWN; ISN'T THAT FAIR?"

4

FAIR."

5

SHE ANSWERED, "THAT'S

SHE MAY HAVE SEEN THE ACCIDENT COMING -- NOT

6

THAT SHE SAW HIM DOING ANYTHING WRONG, BUT SHE KNEW

7

SHE WAS IN A DANGEROUS SITUATION.

8

HAPPEN ALL THE TIME.

9

SEVERE.

ACCIDENTS LIKE THAT

THANK GOODNESS THIS WASN'T

AND I'LL TALK ABOUT THAT NEXT.

BUT YOU TALK

10

ABOUT THESE HORRIBLE ACCIDENTS WE'VE SEEN ON THE

11

FREEWAY, 40, 50 CARS PILED UP.

12

THAT EACH ONE OF THOSE DRIVERS HIT FROM THE FRONT WAS

13

AT FAULT?

14

THE FINGER HAS BEEN POINTED AND IT HASN'T STUCK.

15

COULD YOU INFER FROM

I SUBMIT THAT ISN'T THE CASE.

IN THIS CASE

WHEN YOU GET TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM, WAS

16

MR. SHARP NEGLIGENT, NO, HE WAS NOT.

17

FORMER INSTRUCTION, YOU ANSWER THAT NO AND YOU DON'T

18

HAVE TO ANSWER ALL OF THE OTHER QUESTIONS.

19

HAVE TO GET INTO THE DOCTOR'S RECORDS AND ALL OF THOSE

20

KINDS OF THINGS.

THEY HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR

21

BURDEN OF PROOF.

THEY HAVE NOT SHOWN THAT HE IS

22

NEGLIGENT.

23

HER OWN TESTIMONY, OR AT LEAST ALLOWED YOU TO SEE THE

24

FACTS THAT WOULD CAUSE YOU TO CONCLUDE THAT HE WASN'T.

25

HAVEN'T PUT IT ON.

AND AS THE

YOU DON'T

I THINK I'VE SHOWN BY

HOWEVER, CONTRARY TO YOUR HOPES, I'M NOT
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1

GOING TO SIT DOWN AT THIS POINT.

2

I OWE MY CLIENT THE DUTY TO ADDRESS OTHER ISSUES, AND

3

PLEASE ALLOW ME TO DO THAT IF YOU WOULD BE SO KIND.

4

I APOLOGIZE BECAUSE

THE NEXT QUESTION, OF COURSE IS THE ACCIDENT

5

ITSELF.

6

AND SOME OF THEM MAY SPILL BACK OVER INTO THE

7

LIABILITY CIRCUMSTANCES.

8
9

AND I WANT TO MAKE A COUPLE OF OBSERVATIONS

THE FIRST ONE IS THE FORCES INVOLVED. WHAT
KIND OF FORCE DID WE HAVE HERE AT ALL?

AND THEN THAT

10

OF COURSE WILL GO INTO WHAT THE DOCTORS BASED THEIR

11

TESTIMONY ON.

12

OF CONTROL.

13

WHY I TOLD HIM THAT.

14

IMPRESSION.

15

HAPPEN.

16

HER CAR WAS KNOCKED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.

17

DESCRIBED SOME UNKNOWN FORCE.

18

HER SEAT BROKE AND SHE WAS SHOVED IN THE BACK. I

19

ASSUME THE WAY THAT WENT, THAT HE THOUGHT HER SEAT

20

BROKE AND SHE FLEW INTO THE BACK SEAT AND SQUASHED HER

21

HEAD AND NECK AGAINST THE BACK SEAT.

22

IT SOUNDED LIKE DR. SMITH UNDERSTOOD.

23

THAT'S NOT WHAT HAPPENED.

24

MAKE A LOT MORE SENSE THAT ~

25

SENSE AND YOU CAN SEE WHY HE THINKS WHAT HE THINKS.

DR. MCCLEAN WAS TOLD THE CAR SPUN OUT

MRS. ANDERSON SAYING, GEE, I DON'T KNOW
IT WENT AROUND.

THAT WAS HIS

OF COURSE SHE CONCEDED NO, IT DIDN'T

SHE SAID IT WAS FORCEFUL BUT SHE DIDN'T SAY
SHE JUST

DR. SMITH WAS TOLD THAT

THAT'S THE WAY
OF COURSE

HAD THAT HAPPENED IT WOULD
HIS OPINION WOULD MAKE
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1

AND THAT'S OF COURSE NOT WHAT HAPPENED IN THE

2

ACCIDENT.

3

SIDES OF THE SEAT.

4

SEAT WAS TWISTED.

5

HOWEVER WEAK THE SEAT WAS, IT WAS IN A CONDITION WHERE

6

IT COULD BE PUSHED BACK BY THE PERSON.

7

TAKE A LOT OF FORCE TO PUSH IT A LITTLE WAYS BACK OR

8

CORRECT THE PROBLEM IN THAT CASE.

9

TO MRS. ANDERSON, I OF COURSE NEED TO POINT OUT SHE'S

OF COURSE IT WASN'T EVEN 45, IT WASN'T BOTH
IT WAS TWISTED, ONE SIDE OF THE
WHATEVER WAS WRONG WITH THE CAR,

SO IT DIDN'T

AND WITH APOLOGIES

10

A SUBSTANTIAL PERSON AND I THINK THAT WOULD BE A

11

FACTOR WHETHER A SEAT COULD BE DAMAGED LIKE THAT IN A

12

ACCIDENT OF THIS MINOR IMPACT AS WELL.

13

GEEZ, WHO DIDN'T I CALL AS WITNESSES?

IF HE

14

DIDN'T READ IN DR. SMITH'S TESTIMONY, IF HE DIDN'T

15

READ IN DR. MCCLEAN'S I WOULD HAVE.

16

DENTIST.

17

HAVE YOU LOOK AT THINGS.

18

APOLOGIZE WHAT'S BEEN TERMED A CLAIM AS OPPOSED TO A

19

LAWSUIT.

20

THROUGH HUNDREDS OF PAGES TO TRY TO BE FAIR TO MY

21

CLIENT, AND OF COURSE WE'RE GOING TO MAKE SOME

22

MISTAKES.

23

WOULD HEAR FROM MR. KNIGHT.

24

WANTED MR. KNIGHT TO TESTIFY, WAS TO EXPLAIN THINGS TO

25

YOU.

SAME WITH THE

I HAVE NOT TRIED TO KEEP THINGS OUT AND NOT
AND I'VE MADE MISTAKES AND I

THERE'S A WHOLE BUNCH OF FACTS AND I'VE BEEN

I TOLD YOU FOR INSTANCE THAT I THOUGHT WE
AND THE BIGGEST REASON I

I DIDN'T BECAUSE MR. HOWARD DID IT FOR YOU.

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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1

HE DID IT QUITE NICELY.

2

ACCIDENT.

3

FORCE, OF COURSE, YOU'RE GOING TO GO BACK.

4

HOW THE FORCES WORK IN AN

IF YOU'RE HIT FROM BEHIND WITH ENOUGH

ANOTHER THING I WANTED TO TALK ABOUT WERE THE

5

SPEEDS INVOLVED.

I THOUGHT MR. HOWARD WOULD DISCUSS

6

WE WERE TALKING ABOUT 25 MILES AN HOUR.

7

WORDS WERE 5 I THINK OR 5 TO 15.

8

CAN LOOK AT THE PICTURES.

9

JURY PANEL ASKED IN VOIR DIRE, IS THERE ANYBODY THAT

BUT NO, HIS

BUT THE POINT ~

YOU

AND THAT'S WHY I WANTED THE

10

HASN'T BEEN IN A LITTLE ACCIDENT WHERE THERE'S BEEN

11

EITHER LITTLE OR NO DAMAGE TO THE CAR?

12

KNOW EVERYONE HAS.

13

WERE INVOLVED IN THIS ACCIDENT.

14

PICTURE OF A DUCK AND WE WERE ARGUING ABOUT IS THIS A

15

DUCK OR COW, I WOULDN'T NEED TO BRING A ZOOLOGIST IN

16

HERE —

17

OF GOOD QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPLAIN IT WITH EXPERTS

18

TERMS AND SCIENTIFIC AND LATIN PARTS —

19

NEED A SCIENTIST TO TELL US A DUCK IS A DUCK AND WE

20

DON'T NEED AN EXPERT TO TELL US THIS IS A LOW FORCE

21

WITH THE KIND OF FORCES INVOLVED HERE.

22

I COULD SEE HER.

23

BECAUSE NOW I

YOU ALL KNOW WHAT KIND OF FORCES
IF THIS WERE A

ALTHOUGH I COULD, AND HE COULD GIVE YOU LOTS

BUT WE DON'T

MR. SHARP SAID

SHE WASN'T THROWN ABOUT THE VEHICLE.

HOWEVER, AGAIN, BECAUSE MR. HOWARD WAS KIND

24

ENOUGH TO POINT OUT THE FACT THAT THINGS GO THE

25

OPPOSITE DIRECTION.

THAT'S NEWTON'S SECOND LAW OF
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1

MOTION ~

2

ENGINEERING BACKGROUND —

3

MOTION; FOR EVERY REACTION THERE'S AN EQUAL AND

4

OPPOSITE REACTION.

5

GOES FORWARD, YOU WANT TO REMAIN AT REST AND YOU GO

6

BACK.

7

WITH THOSE WITH THAT PROFESSIONAL
AT LEAST ONE OF HIS LAWS OF

YOU'RE HIT FROM BEHIND, YOUR CAR

WHERE WERE THE ITEMS IN THE CAR?

8

IN THE FRONT SEAT, NOT THE BACK.

9

THINGS ON THE PERSON —

THEY WERE

WHERE WERE THE

WHATEVER, ON THE BACK SEAT?

10

IF SHE WAS HIT HARD FROM BEHIND THOSE WOULDN'T HAVE

11

FLOWN TO THE FRONT.

12

THE BACK OR STAYED AGAINST THE BACK SEAT?

13

GET TO THE FRONT?

14

QUIZZED HER IN HER DEPOSITION.

15

THROWN FORWARD RATHER THAN BACK, AS OPPOSED TO HOW

16

MR. HOWARD DESCRIBED BACKWARDS FIRST, THEN FORWARD?

17

BECAUSE SHE WAS BRAKING.

18

TOLD US SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE SHE WAS BRAKING BECAUSE

19

SHE WAS CLOSE ENOUGH TO CARS IN FRONT, SHE HAD TO

20

BRAKE HARD.

21

BRAKED, BROKE, SLOWED DOWN OR USED HER BRAKES HARD

22

ENOUGH TO CAUSE THE THINGS TO FLY TO THE FRONT BECAUSE

23

THAT'S THE ONLY WAY THEY COULD GET THERE, TO CAUSE HER

24

TO GO FORWARD IN HER SEAT AND AS SHE LET OFF THE BRAKE

25

SHE WOULD GO BACK, OR AS SHE WAS BUMPED SHE COULD GO

THEY WOULD HAVE FLOWN FURTHER TO
HOW DID SHE

HOW DID MRS. ANDERSON -- AND I
HOW COME SHE WAS

AND I'VE POINTED OUT SHE

SHE MAY HAVE BRAKED —

I'M NOT SURE,

CREED H. BARKER, CSR

VOL. Ill, PG. 235

X

BACK AS WELL IF THERE WAS ANY SIGNIFICANT FORCE.

2

THAT'S HOW THOSE THINGS GOT TO THE FRONT.

3

FAIR INFERENCE FROM THAT IS SHE SLOWED DOWN QUICKLY IN

4

THAT SNOW.

5

AND THE

I DON'T PARTICULARLY KNOW IF WE OUGHT TO SAY

6

YES, SHE'S NEGLIGENT AND WEIGH ANY KIND OF NEGLIGENCE.

7

I'M NOT WILLING TO POINT THE FINGER AND SAY IN THOSE

8

CIRCUMSTANCES SHE'S WRONG OR IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE,

9

MR. SHARP OUGHT TO HAVE MONEY FOR THAT. THE ONLY

10

REASON I WANTED THAT ON THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM IS IF

11

THE KIND OF THINGS MR. SHARP DID OR DID NOT DO, ARE

12

NEGLIGENT —

13

WEIGH THAT AGAINST WHAT SHE DID; HOW QUICK DID SHE

14

BRAKE?

15

SHE FOLLOW THAT SHE HAD TO BRAKE HARD ENOUGH THAT

16

THINGS WENT TO THE FRONT SEAT?

WHICH THEY'RE NOT —

THEN YOU HAVE TO

HOW QUICK DID SHE SLOW DOWN?

17

HOW CLOSE DID

ENOUGH ABOUT THAT.

I WOULD SUBMIT TO YOU THERE'S NOT ENOUGH

18

FORCE IN THIS.

AND AGAIN, THAT GOES BACK TO WHAT

19

MRS. ANDERSON AND MR. HOWARD HOPES YOU HEARD BUT YOU

20

DIDN'T.

21

REMEMBER."

22

MAN.

23

HE WOULD SAY:

24

LIKE BEFORE THE ACCIDENT.

25

AS A MATTER OF FACT.

MR. SHARP DIDN'T SAY.

HE DID SAY, "I DON'T

I THINK THAT TELLS YOU HE'S A CREDIBLE

BECAUSE IF HE WAS GOING TO TRY AND HELP HIMSELF,
ABSOLUTELY I REMEMBER WHAT THAT CAR WAS
ALL OF THIS WAS PREEXISTING

HE WOULDN'T HAVE CONCEDED A DENT
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1

IN THE HOOD AT ALL.

HE TOLD YOU WHAT HE COULD

2

REMEMBER THE BEST AND HE TOLD YOU HE COULDN'T

3

REMEMBER.

4

YOU WHAT MR. HOWARD SAID AND SHE ALSO SAID I DON'T

5

KNOW HOW —

6

REPAIRED NOT COMPLETELY.

7

LOOKED AT NUMBER 48, WHAT SHE DID SAY WAS THAT THE

8

CONDITION OF THIS BUMPER WAS THE SAME BEFORE THE

9

ACCIDENT.

BEEN A LONG TIME.

MRS. SHARP DIDN'T TELL

FIRST OF ALL SHE SAID THE BUMPER WAS
WHAT SHE DID SAY WHEN SHE

THERE WAS NO FURTHER DAMAGE.

I DON'T CARE

10

AND MR. HOWARD HAS A GOOD POINT; WELL IT MAY HAVE BEEN

11

DIFFERENT OR THE PREEXISTING ACCIDENT ISN'T REALLY

12

THAT RELEVANT.

13

TO SEE THAT IS WHY THEY'RE DRIVING AROUND WITH A BENT

14

BUMPER BEFORE THE ACCIDENT.

15

SAME BEFORE THIS ACCIDENT.

16

ONLY EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE DONE TO EITHER VEHICLE IN THIS

17

ACCIDENT, IS THE LITTLE —

18

IT'S ONLY AN 8TH OF AN INCH DEEP IN THE HOOD.

19

MR. SHARP POINTED IT OUT AND THE PLASTIC GRILL.

20

MADE A SLIGHT DENT IN THE BACK OF THIS CAR AND CAUSED

21

THE PLASTIC ON A COLD DAY TO BREAK AND PARTIALLY

22

FALLOUT ON THE ROAD.

23

VEHICLE AND SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES; WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE

24

FELT IN THAT CAR?

25

YOU'RE ARTHRITIC AND HAVE PROBLEMS?

IT'S NOT.

THE ONLY REASON I WANT YOU

BUT SHE SAID IT WAS THE
THE ONLY TESTIMONY, THE

I CALL IT A SCRATCH IF

—

AND
IT

THINK IF YOU WERE IN THIS

WOULD YOU HAVE BEEN INJURED EVEN IF
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1

BEEN HURT IN THAT?

2

I THINK THE ANSWER TO THAT IS NO.

REGARDLESS, WHEN YOU GET DOWN TO THE NEXT

3

QUESTION, WHATEVER YOU SAY ON NEGLIGENCE —

4

I'M ARGUING TO WHAT I THINK YOU DON'T NEED TO GET TO.

5

MR. HOWARD:

AND NOW

I DON'T THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE

6

TO ASK THE JURY TO PUT THEMSELVES IN THE POSITION OF

7

SOMEBODY.

8
9

MR. PEATROSS:

AND I'M HAPPY TO REPHRASE IT

TO CONSIDER.

10

THE COURT:

DO SO, PLEASE.

11

MR. PEATROSS:

PLEASE CONSIDER THE FORCE

12

EXERTED ON HER IN THIS CAR UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES;

13

WHAT SHE MUST HAVE FELT, NOT FROM BRAKING HARD BUT

14

FROM THIS IMPACT.

15

ARE ALLOWED TO DO IN MAKING THAT CONSIDERATION.

16

AND USE YOUR EXPERIENCE, WHICH YOU

IN ANY EVENT, IF YOU GET TO QUESTION NUMBER

17

2, WAS HE A APPROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT AND THE

18

INJURIES?

19

DIDN'T CAUSE HER ANY HARM IN THIS.

20

THE POLICE OFFICER, PLEASE CALL AN AMBULANCE OR TELL

21

ANYONE SHE'S HURT OR TELL MR. SHARP SHE WAS HURT.

22

EVEN IF SHE WAS UPSET AND HAD A MINOR INJURY AND

23

NOTICED IT WHEN SHE GOT TO SALT LAKE, SURELY IF SHE

24

WOULD HAVE HAD AN INJURY SHE WOULD HAVE NOTICED IT BY

25

THE TIME SHE WENT TO THE MOVIES AND TO DINNER.

NO, HE WAS NOT.

WHATEVER HAPPENED, HE
SHE DIDN'T TELL
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1

DIDN'T.

HOURS LATER SHE'S OFF TO THE MOVIES AND IT'S

2

NOT UNTIL THE NEXT DAY THAT SHE BELIEVES SHE HAS SOME

3

SORT OF INJURY.

4

ONE OF THEM WAS THE EMERGENCY ROOM RECORD BECAUSE WE

5

AGREED THE CONTENTS WERE THAT SHE HAD REPORTS THAT SHE

6

HAD A BACK INJURY OR HIP.

7

MY NECK HURTS A LITTLE."

AND THEY NOTE THERE'S NO

8

RANGE OF MOTION PROBLEM.

IF INDEED, AS MR. HOWARD

9

SUGGESTED, BASED UPON MR. SMITH'S OBSERVATIONS, BASED

I USED OVER-HEADS YOU DIDN'T SEE, AND

SHE WENT AND SAID, "LOOK,

10

AGAIN UPON HER HISTORY THAT SOME ACCIDENT SOMEHOW

11

DAMAGED THAT DISC, ONE WOULD THINK THAT HAD TO HURT

12

AND THEY WOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT IN THE EMERGENCY

13

ROOM.

14

SMITH'S, SHE ALREADY HAD THE STRAIN OF THE SPINE.

15

THAT WASN'T CAUSED OR CREATED FROM THIS KIND OF

16

ACCIDENT.

17

THAN GETTING INTO DETAIL, I THINK YOU CAN SEE WHERE

18

HER CONDITION COMES FROM.

19

PROBLEMS.

20

AND YOU REMEMBER HOW IN THE FIRST ACCIDENT AT

THAT BRINGS UP A LOT OF OTHER ISSUES RATHER

SHE ALREADY HAD THESE

SO THAT BRINGS ME TO ONE FINAL POINT.

AND

21

PLEASE, I'M JUST GOING PAST MANY OF THE THINGS I

22

THOUGHT I WOULD GET UP AND TALK ABOUT, BUT I BELIEVE

23

YOU CAN SORT THROUGH IT.

24

GET PAST THAT FIRST QUESTION, AND THAT IS WHAT CAUSED

25

HER CONDITION AND WHY DID THE DOCTORS SAY WHAT THEY

IF YOU BELIEVE YOU NEED TO
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DID, YOU KNOW THE HISTORY THE DOCTORS HAD.

THEY

2

WEREN'T IN THE JURY BOX WITH YOU.

3

MINUTES, AN HOUR ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND THEY

4

HEARD HER SAY I'VE BEEN IN A BAD CAR ACCIDENT AND I'M

5

HURT, AND NATURALLY ASSUMED, YES, THAT WAS THE CAUSE.

6

BUT WHAT DID DR. SMITH TELL YOU?

7

ME SHE WAS IN THE ACCIDENT I WOULDN'T HAVE SAID:

8

YOU'VE BEEN IN AN ACCIDENT.

9

MCCLEAN.

THEY SAW HER A FEW

"IF SHE DIDN'T TELL
HEY

NEITHER WOULD DR.

THESE KINDS OF PROBLEMS, EVERY SINGLE

10

PROBLEM SHE'S HAD, SHE WOULD HAVE HAD ANY WAY OR

11

CLEARLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO SOMETHING ELSE.

12

WE HAVE TO SCRATCH OUR HEADS AND SAY, GEE HOW COULD

13

SHE HAVE BEEN HURT IN THIS MINOR ACCIDENT, BECAUSE

14

THERE'S VERY CLEAR AND OBVIOUS REASONS WHY.

15

EVEN THE DENTAL PROBLEM.

IT'S NOT LIKE

IF YOU LOOK AT DR.

16

BRIMHALL'S TESTIMONY, HE GOT A LITTLE SURPRISED AT THE

17

FIRST TRIAL, YOU MAY HAVE REALIZED WHEN HE FIRST HEARD

18

IT.

19

ONLY BEEN A DENTIST A SHORT TIME.

20

IN BECAUSE THEY HAVE A JAGGED OR BROKEN TOOTH.

21

DIDN'T HAVE A JAGGED OR BROKEN TOOTH OFF THIS

22

ACCIDENT.

23

NOW WHETHER YOU NORMALLY BREAK YOUR TOOTH OFF OR NOT

24

EATING RAISIN BRAN, HE DIDN'T THINK SO.

25

KNOW WHETHER IT WAS THE SLIP AND FALL THAT CRACKED IT

HE HADN'T HEARD ABOUT THE FALL THING, AND HE HAD
HE SAID PEOPLE COME
SHE

SHE HAD IT ONLY AFTER EATING RAISIN BRAN.
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X

OR WHETHER SHE ACTUALLY BROKE HER TEETH WHEN EATING

2

RAISIN BRAN.

3

SHE WENT THAT IT WAS THIS ACCIDENT THAT CAUSED IT.

4

AND THERE'S NO PROOF THERE AND IT'S A GOOD EXAMPLE OF

5

THE REST OF THE DAMAGES THAT IT'S ALL BASED UPON

6

SUPPOSITION AND HOPE THAT'S WHAT WAS PROVED WHEN IN

7

FACT IT WASN'T.

8
9

SHE DIDN'T EVEN TELL DR. BRIMHALL WHEN

FINALLY, THE DAMAGE FIGURED SUGGESTED -- LET
ME START WITH THE SPECIAL DAMAGES.

I DON'T REMEMBER

10

THE FIGURE, 15,000 SOMETHING FOR THE MEDICALS, 16,000

11

SOMETHING FOR LOST HOUSEHOLD SERVICES —

12

PROOF AS TO WHICH OF THOSE, IF ANY, WAS CAUSE BY THIS

13

ACCIDENT?

14

REMOTELY CAUSED BY THIS ACCIDENT IS WHATEVER CHARGE

15

RELATES FOR THAT FIRST HOSPITAL VISIT THE NEXT DAY.

16

IF YOU GO THROUGH THE RECORDS —

17

BE GLAD TO KNOW I HAD THOSE ALL STACKED UP FOR

18

OVER-HEADS AND THOUGHT IT NOT NECESSARY TO GO THROUGH

19

ALL OF THEM.

20

IF YOU THINK IT'S NECESSARY, DO IT.

21

THERAPY NOTES IT STATES: SHE CAME IN BECAUSE SHE

22

SLIPPED AND FELL.

23

SHE LIFTED HER SON WHO WAS INJURED, AS WE FOUND OUT,

24

HAD TO LIFT AND CARE FOR HIM.

25

HE'S A LARGE INDIVIDUAL.

WHERE IS THE

I WOULD SUBMIT THE ONLY ONE THAT'S EVEN

AND AGAIN YOU WOULD

IF YOU GO THROUGH THOSE RECORDS —

AND

OFTEN IN PHYSICAL

HER BACK IS BOTHERING HER TODAY.

AND AT ONE POINT NOTES

HE'S NOT AS BIG AS ME BUT IT
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1

SAYS 200 LBS., AND SURE, SHE HAD ARTHRITIS, DOING

2

THESE THINGS AND SHE'S IN GETTING TREATMENT.

3

EVERY DOLLAR OF THAT AMOUNT, EVERY PENNY HAS BEEN

4

CLAIMED IN THIS ACCIDENT WITH ABSOLUTELY NO PROOF

5

WHATSOEVER.

6

CAN GET OUT OF HIS TRANSCRIPT AND THD QUOTE WAS:

7

I COULD TELL FOR YOU SURE, SHE CAME TO SEE ME BECAUSE

8

OF DISCOMFORT."

9

PIN HIM DOWN.

THAT'S WHAT HE SAID. APPARENTLY

10

ASYMPTOMATIC.

BUT ALL HE COULD SAY, NOT USING THE

11

PLAINTIFF'S FACTS, WAS SHE CAME IN, AND HE SAID WELL

12

THERE'S NO PROOF THAT THAT CAME FROM THIS ACCIDENT.

13

ALL THOSE BILLS, THERE'S THERAPY FOR LOW BACK,

14

MID-BACK, FOR HEADACHES, FOR ALL THOSE OTHER THINGS,

15

EPSTEIN-BARR DISEASE, FIBROMYALGIA, WHICH MAY OR MAY

16

NOT BE RELATED TO TRAUMA, MICROTRAUMA, THE MOSAICING,

17

IN DR. SMITH'S WORDS.

18

WE'VE PROVED IT, IT'S UNREFUTED.

19

AGREEING THOSE BILLS WERE CAUSED FROM THIS CASE, AND

20

THERE'S ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO PIN THOSE TO ANY INJURY

21

RECEIVED IN THIS ACCIDENT.

22

DID SOMETHING WRONG, MR. SHARP DID SOMETHING WRONG,

23

THE ONLY THING I WOULD SUGGEST, IF SHE DID HAVE SOME

24

INJURIES, SLIGHT INJURIES, SHE MAY HAVE FELT; I BETTER

25

GO TO THE HOSPITAL AND GET CHECKED OUT, BECAUSE

BUT

THE ONLY THING DR. SMITH SAID -- AND I

I THINK WAS HIS WORDS.

"ALL

THAT'S WHEN I

HOW CAN THEY COME UP AND SAY
I DON'T REMEMBER

SO IF YOU THINK MY CLIENT
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1

GRANTED SHE'S A NERVOUS, EXCITABLE INDIVIDUAL AND I

2

THINK WE'VE SEEN THAT, AND SHE IS ENTITLED TO BE

3

NERVOUS AND EXCITABLE, FRANKLY.

4

IF SHE FELT LIKE SHE OUGHT TO GO TO THE HOSPITAL AND

5

GET CHECKED OUT AND IT WAS HIS FAULT, THEN YOU CAN

6

CONSIDER PUTTING IT IN.

7

HUNDRED DOLLARS -- YOU CAN LOOK AT THE BILL.

8

KNOW IF IT WAS $400.00.

9

NEEDED IT CHECKED OUT, THEN HE OUGHT TO PAY FOR THAT.

THAT'S HER BUSINESS.

I DON'T KNOW IF IT'S A
I DON'T

AND THEN IN FAIRNESS IF SHE

10

BUT THAT'S THE ONLY THING THAT COULD POSSIBLY BE

11

RELATED.

BUT I DON'T THINK IT IS AS FAR AS GENERAL

12

DAMAGES.

SHE WAS EXCITED.

13

SHOULD HAVE MONEY BECAUSE SHE WAS SCARED AND WANTED IT

14

CHECKED OUT, AND DO AS MR. HOWARD SUGGESTS AND GIVE

15

HER TWO OR THREE TIMES THAT HUNDRED DOLLAR BILL, AND

16

IF HE WAS AT FAULT AND CAUSED THE ACCIDENT AND IF YOU

17

THINK IT'S FAIR TO CLAIM THAT, THEN I WOULD SUGGEST

18

THAT'S WHAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IF HE WERE AT FAULT.

19

BUT NOT TO SAY GIVE US ALL THAT MONEY WITHOUT

20

CONNECTION, NOT TO TAKE A PERCENTAGE AND A MILLION

21

DOLLARS, 4 PERCENT, THAT'S 40,000 AND BILLS THEY

22

HAVEN'T PROVED, THAT'S 50,000.

23

THE QUESTION IF YOU GET PAST 1.

IF YOU THINK IT'S FAIR SHE

THAT'S HOW YOU ANSWER

24

I DIDN'T HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

25

REASON, I COULD HAVE SAT AT THIS TABLE AND NOT DONE A
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I

THING BUT GOT UP AT THE END AND SAID THEY DIDN'T PROVE

%

IT, AND THEN SIT DOWN.

3

HIS BURDEN AND NOT MINE.

4

FOR THAT REASON, BECAUSE IT'S

MR. HOWARD GETS TO GET BACK UP AND TELL YOU

5

WHY WHAT I'VE TOLD YOU ISN'T TRUE.

AND HE'LL DO THAT

6

AND I'M SURE HE'LL DO A FINE JOB.

BUT PLEASE, IF YOU

7

WOULD, IF I SAY SOMETHING WRONG REMEMBER THE FACTS OF

8

THE CASE AND NOT THE ARGUMENT.

9

WHAT —

10

AND SEE IF IT'S FAIR.

11

FIRST QUESTION "NO" ON THAT FORM SO WE CAN BE DONE AND

12

MY CLIENTS CAN GO HOME.

13
14
15
16
17
18

AND PLEASE THINK OF

ANALYZE WHAT HE TELLS YOU BASED UPON THE FACTS

THE COURT:

AND THEN GO BACK AND MARK THE

THANK YOU.

REBUTTAL MR. HOWARD.

(REBUTTAL CLOSING ARGUMENT OF MR. HOWARD)
THE COURT:

I ASK THE CLERK TO SWEAR THE

BAILIFF AND TAKE THE JURY IN CHARGE.
(BAILIFF SWORN)
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT, IF YOU'LL GO NOW WITH

19

THE BAILIFF TO COMMENCE DELIBERATIONS, I'LL GIVE YOU

20

THE INSTRUCTIONS AND THE VERDICT FORM NOW, AND WE'LL

21

BRING THE EXHIBITS IN IN JUST A MINUTE.

22

(JURY BEGAN DELIBERATIONS AT 12:40 A.M.)

23

MR. HOWARD:

I NEED TO MAKE A RECORD.

I MADE

24

PART OF IT WHEN YOU WERE OUT.

25

DIRECTED VERDICT AND NOW I NEED TO MAKE A SUBSEQUENT

I MADE A MOTION FOR

CREED H. BARKER, CSR

